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ABSTRACT
TELEVISION AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE 
IN THE ERA OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
John E. Roos 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Philip Taylor
The role television played in the integration of 
Europe through 1987 is examined in an analysis focusing on 
historical trends, integration theory, and the effect of 
satellite technology on the political environment in 
Europe. Television remained under the jurisdiction of 
national governments since its inception, satellite 
communications challenged the system of national control of 
television and changed television's role in Europe by 
introducing a revolutionary new delivery system.
Integration theorists are cited to define the integration 
process and provide a foundation for a study of 
television's impact on European integration. Television 
policies in each nation are examined to document their past 
nationalistic nature. Intergovernmental organizations are 
surveyed to understand their function in the formulation of 
European television policies. The private sector's use of 
satellites is cited to document how its actions encouraged 
integration in the marketplace. It is shown that the 
integration of the television market will precede European 
integration and that satellite television provided the 
communication tool that will stimulate this integration.
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CHAPTER ONE 
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND 
THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE
On November 1, 1986, a television service that 
described itself as the first "truly European television 
service" ceased operations.1 Appropriately enough, it had 
been called ’’Europa," and in concept it was to have 
created an entertainment and information source that 
people throughout the continent could watch regardless of 
the language they spoke. Europa was to utilize audio 
subcarriers on new, European-built and -launched 
satellites to simulcast programs throughout Europe in all 
its major languages. This technology made it possible to 
have many separate voice channels for each video image, 
enabling all Europeans to watch the same programs, yet hear 
them in their own languages.2
Europa was created in 1984 by the European
1 Throughout this thesis, "Europe” will refer 
specifically to the nations of western Europe. This will 
exclude activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and 
the German Democratic Republic.
2 European Broadcasting Union, "Europa: Television 
for Olympus Satellite," 1986, pp. 1-4.
1
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Broadcasting Union (EBU), the consortium of more than 100 
private companies and national government departments 
responsible for broadcasting activities throughout Europe.3 
From its beginning it was designed as a service to bring 
Europe together and champion European culture in its many 
varieties. It adopted the motto, "From Europe, for 
Europe." Its programs were to be of European origin 
because "Europe has its own culture and wholly European 
programming will reflect that culture and contribute to 
it." Programs also were to be selected for appeal to all 
Europeans to foster solidarity.4
Another major European intergovernmental 
organization (IGO) which championed Europa was the European 
Economic Community (EC). The creation of Europa partly 
was in response to a resolution of March 12, 1982, by the 
EC's European Parliament (EP), which called for the 
establishment of a "European television channel."3 The EC 
Commission lobbied for wide participation and funding and
3 Television is a broadcasting medium, involving the 
electronic distribution of simultaneous visual and audio 
images. It is also a communications medium, and a 
telecommunications medium, a term referring to the relaying 
of communication through electronic impulses. While 
broadcasting also refers to media such as radio, and 
telecommunications encompasses such media as telephones and 
telegraph, when used in this thesis these terms apply to 
television.
4 European Broadcasting Union, "Europa," pp. 2-3.
3 Commission of the European Communities, Television 
Without Frontiers, (COM (84) 300) (1984), p. 12.
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gave $1 million from its own budget in October 1986 to 
sustain Europa operations.6 The Commission believed Europa 
was a television service that could help fulfill its goal 
of "a unified European market in goods and services by 
1992. "7
The EC took a more vigorous role in encouraging 
European television activities because leaders throughout 
the Community concluded that television was pivotal in 
shaping the future of Europe. Commission Vice President, 
Lord Cockfield, expressed the view of the Commission that 
television was not just an entertainment medium or another 
business. "Television does not merely reflect but plays an 
important role in forming our modern society and our modern 
Europe." He concluded that "a fragmented Europe of 
national broadcasters is political and economic nonsense."8 
This echoed the E P 's charge that national government 
control of television and other mass media undermined 
efforts to foster a European identification among the 
peoples of Europe and reenforced national loyalties. 
"Information" was "the most decisive factor in European 
unification," but the system in which "information via the
6Ripa di Meana, speech delivered at the Conference 
on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 
16, 1986.
7 Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards 
for Television," Europe, December 1986, p. 16.
8 Ibid.
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mass media is controlled at the national level" must be 
superseded by a uniform television policy if European 
unification was to be achieved.9
The Europa project developed significant support 
throughout the Community. Yet it faced many obstacles. 
Programming, production, and transmission costs proved 
higher than expected, and viewing audiences and advertising 
revenues were below projections. Although backed by the 
EBU, Europa was not financially supported by most EBU 
member-nations, since each nation retained the option of 
whether or not to participate. Such nations as France and 
the U.K. expressed interest in Europa,10 but after more 
than a year of operation, only five nations were 
participating in the project: the Netherlands (the host
nation), West Germany, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy. Even 
though it was supported by these governments, the EBU, the 
EP, the EC Commission, and other organizations, Europa was 
forced to halt operations. However, the collapse of 
Europa brought new focus on the role of television in 
shaping the future of Europe. Europa had begun to 
demonstrate the potential of satellite television to 
provide daily programming for many nations simultaneously, 
but the fragmented European marketplace of 1986 made
9Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 2.
10Di Meana Speech.
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success impossible.11
Europe's inability to work together to sustain 
Europa symbolized European political and economic realities 
in the mid-1980s. Europa's demise came during the same 
year the Community approved the "Single European Act," by 
which the EC became committed to the creation of a truly 
common market by 1992. The Community was to exist without 
internal impediments to the flow of goods and services 
throughout Europe.12 But actions of Community member- 
nations in failing to support television activities like 
Europa seemed to contradict their commitment to pursue 
greater unification. Ripa di Meana, the EC Commissioner 
for Information and Culture, was one of the Community 
leaders who was puzzled by these contradictions. He 
believed the failure of Europe's nation-states to support 
Europa proved that Europe was still fragmented and 
approached issues primarily from national perspectives.13
European unification was the goal of men like Ripa 
di Meana and Lord Cockfield who worked within the political 
realm. At the same time, the actions of these men, 
nations, and organizations were continuously scrutinized by
^Pamela Williams and Laurel Wentz, "Europa TV in 
Trouble," Advertising Age. November 10, 1986, p. 72.
12"The Institutions of the European Community," 
Europe, May 1987, p. 23.
13"Losses Prompt Europa Channel to Shut Down 
Operations," Multichannel News. December 15, 1986, p. 23.
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6political scientists who were students cf the integration 
process. Europe became a living laboratory for these 
scientists as they sought to study the formation of 
political organizations and to understand more clearly the 
actions that took place in Europe. Integration theorists 
analyzed the formation of nations and identified the 
causes and impediments of integration. They also defined 
terms such as "integration." Europe was a region of on­
going study because of its unique history and composition. 
Scientists specifically probed developments in post-World 
War II Europe to examine events in light of developed 
theory.
One of the most influential studies of the subject 
was a 1957 inquiry conducted by Karl Deutsch and seven 
colleagues at Princeton University. They defined 
"integration" as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 
'sense of community' and of institutions and practices 
strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' 
time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among 
its population." These scholars defined "sense of 
community" as a "belief on the part of individuals in a 
group that they have come to agreement on at least this one 
point: that common social problems must and can be
resolved by processes of peaceful change."14 Using this
14 Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kann,
Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, 
Francis Loewenheim, Richard Van Wagener, Political
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7broad definition Europe could be described as "integrated.” 
Deutsch, et al., divided integrated groups of people into 
two classifications:
(1) Groups became amalgamated when previously 
independent units merged into a new single larger unit, 
with a common government. The United States was an example 
of this kind of organization. Since European nations 
retained independent governments, Europe was not 
amalgamated.
(2) In contrast, pluralistic communities were 
composed of nations with legally independent governments. 
This kind of community existed when key leaders held 
relatively harmonized beliefs and expectations and acted 
in a predictable manner toward each other and the world.
The relationship between the United States and Canada was 
an example of a pluralistic community. Since European 
nations maintained separate governments and had developed 
harmonized beliefs and expectations, Europe qualified as a 
pluralistic community.13
The respected integration theorist, Ernst Haas, 
defined "political integration" as "the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and
Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 6.
13 Ibid.
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political activities toward a new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre­
existing national states."16 Within this definition,
Europe fell short of complete integration. The shift in 
loyalties was partial, and jurisdiction remained largely in 
the hands of national governments. However, developments 
related to satellite television demonstrated that 
expectations began to shift toward a new center in Europe 
and illustrated the important function television could 
play in integration.
Another integration theorist, Amitai Etzioni, 
distinguished between political communities and a larger 
group, which he called "political systems." When parts of 
systems were "interrelated," they might have different 
levels of integration. These kinds of systems were 
"interdependent." On the other hand, members of political 
communities were "integrated." This "integration of the 
members of a community is self-maintained by definition."17 
Etzioni divided the unification process into four stages:
(1) The first was the preunification stage, which 
involved an identification of each individual unit before 
unification, a view of these units in aggregate form, the 
environment which impacted the unification, and the degree
16 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.
17Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 137.
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of interdependence and integration before the integration 
process began. Television was an environmental factor in 
this process.
(2) The second stage focused on the various ways 
elite groups influenced these units. When action involved 
force (including military, economic, or psychological), the 
power was said to be coercive. Elite groups acted in 
utilitarian ways when their actions came about through 
interaction in common social contexts. In the television 
debate, the elites in Europe included various governmental 
and intergovernmental organizations, special interest 
groups, business organizations, and entrepreneurs.
(3) In the third stage, preunification 
transitional conditions came into being and various groups 
and forces acted to bring about greater integration. 
Unification was achieved in increasing unit sectors. In 
Europe, this phase was being stimulated by the development 
of satellite television and the actions taken to increase 
pan-European television activity.
(4) The final stage concluded the process, when 
the organization became integrated or the integration 
process stopped.18
This thesis utilizes the model developed by Etzioni 
as it applies to the situation in Europe at the end of 
1987. With Etzioni's four-stage model as a basis,
18 Ibid., pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.
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supplemented by the work of Haas and Deutsch, the concept 
that integration of television activity is leading to the 
integration of Europe is tested. The thesis demonstrates 
that satellite television modified the character of the 
European television industry and forced changes in efforts 
by national governments to control television activities.
It shows that the introduction of satellite technology made 
television policy a bellwether of European integration 
efforts. If the nations of Europe were found to be 
blocking further integration of the television market, it 
is hypothesized that then they were blocking integration 
itself. The evolution of the television industry 
throughout Europe is cited as evidence of the impact of 
satellite technology on national controls over television 
and the decisions nations were forced to make regarding 
their overall role in the future of Europe.
This hypothesis assumes that no radical political 
changes take place to affect significantly economic, 
military, or political power in Europe or the world. It 
also assumes that the nations of Europe continue to work 
through their differences amicably, eschewing courses of 
action that would increase nationalism or divisiveness, 
and would actively embrace a European approach to their 
problems. It presumes that there would be no social, 
climatic, religious, scientific, geological, or 
sociological changes of any significance to alter radically
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the nature of society in Europe. While this thesis seeks 
to determine whether television in Europe acted as a 
catalyst to stimulate integration, other scenarios are 
possible.
In one scenario, integration would decline as the 
Europeanization of television and the European nations are 
resisted and nation-states reaffirm their controls. In 
this scenario, satellite television would be developed in 
Europe, but nations would take steps to assure continued 
jurisdiction over this medium. In a second scenario, 
integration would develop simultaneously along two or more 
paths. Some nations would elect to limit their 
participation in the integration process, electing to 
retain national control over television policy and other 
aspects of their national life and culture. However, other 
nations would determine to proceed with integration on a 
regional or lesser scale. A third scenario would be the 
continuation of the situation as it existed in 1987. 
Integration would be acknowledged as a goal to be pursued, 
but national governments would retain national identity and 
individuality as a priority, thus restricting the 
development of integration.
Using the television industry in Europe in 1987 as 
a reference point, this thesis demonstrates the degree to 
which Europe lacked unity, particularly in the pre­
satellite era. It will trace the development of television
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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throughout the continent and detail the policies and 
practices that evolved to govern its operations. The 
history of television in each European nation is cited as 
proof of the nationalistic nature of the television 
industry prior to 1987. This evolution resulted in 
markedly different and sometimes contradictory policies as 
each nation pursued television along individual lines. It 
is demonstrated that these non-complementary policies 
acted to discourage unification by reenforcing national 
loyalties, traditions, and customs. These were 
environmental factors in stage one of Etzioni*s model. 
However, the introduction of satellite communications 
provided new challenges both to the television industry and 
the governments of Europe.
The role of IGOs involved with television is 
detailed as the elite groups of Europe acted to bring about 
more coordination of television policies. This was the 
second phase of unification in action. Outlined are the 
variable contributions of these IGOs to the integration 
process. Specific focus is given to the EC. Each branch 
is examined to reveal exactly how it approached television 
and how its actions affected integration.
Marketplace activities are surveyed from the 
development of television through the introduction of 
satellite communications. This represented stage three of 
Etzioni's model in which greater integration took place in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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various sectors of Europe, as increased unification was 
achieved in more sectors.
Finally, an evaluation of the fourth stage in 
Etzioni's model as related to the television industry in 
Europe in 1987 is given. Indicators will be identified to 
measure the progress of integration, the impact television 
policy had on integration activities, and the proof of the 
thesis and alternative scenarios.
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CHAPTER TWO 
EUROPEAN TELEVISION AND 
THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION
Since the beginning of recorded history, Europe had 
been a geographical territory encompassing many groups of 
people. They developed seme shared customs and traditions, 
yet remained separated by language differences and by 
national, local, or regional customs and traditions. While 
people worldwide understood what it meant to be "European," 
Europe had never truly been united as a political entity.
The concept of a unified Europe inspired many 
distinguished writers, philosophers, historians, social 
scientists, and politicians throughout history. Voltaire, 
in the 18th century, wrote that Europe might be considered 
"one great republic, divided into several states."1 
Rousseau wrote that "today there are no more French, 
Germans, Spaniards, or even English. . . There are only 
Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, 
the same way of life."2 In the nineteenth century, Victor
1 Cited in Denis de Rougement, The Idea of Europe, 
trans. by Norbert Guterman (New York: Meridian Books,
1968), p. 148.
2 Ibid., p. 54.
14
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Hugo wrote, "In the twentieth century there will be an 
extraordinary nation. . . It will be called Europe."3 
Since the tine of the Greek and Roman Empires, Europeans 
significantly influenced the world's economic and political 
life. At one time or other between the fifteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Europeans colonized and controlled 
vast parts of North and South America, Africa, Asia, as 
well as Australia and many of the world's islands.
European nations expanded their kingdoms and empires while 
retaining unique rivalries and alliances. But after World 
War II these nations were no longer able to play a dominant 
role in world political, military, or economic spheres.
Many Europeans believed that Europe could regain 
initiative and become a major force in the world again by 
pooling the resources, peoples, and power of its nations. 
Leaders sought ways to increase a sensitivity to the 
interdependence of all Europeans and to develop combined 
European attitudes toward international issues. French 
diplomat, Jean Monnet, perhaps the most influential 
advocate of European unification, argued that only through 
greater political and economic unity could Europe escape 
future wars and fulfill its potential in the world.4 
Efforts by Monnet and others such as Winston Churchill and
3 Ibid., p. 265.
4 Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1978), p. 272.
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French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, led to the 
establishment of organizations such as the Council of 
Europe and the EC, which fostered unified European 
discussions of major concerns and solutions to a wide range 
of problems.
By the 1980s, the nations of Western Europe had 
achieved considerable progress toward unification. The 
continent was no longer dominated by the bitter rivalries 
and fragile alliances that had distinguished the region for 
centuries. In contrast, its nations were combining efforts 
in many notable ways. For example, they had formed the 
world’s largest trading partnership.3 Europe spoke with 
one voice in many forums throughout the world in matters 
relative to trade, technological standards, and monetary 
policy. Nations within the EC often negotiated as a unit, 
and the EC itself maintained embassies wor?.dwide. To a 
significant extent, these nations had become a common 
market and a unified force. Europeans proved that when 
they worked together as a unit and pooled their resources, 
they had an impact on the world that separately they could 
not have. The general public throughout Europe also 
recognized the positive contributions of a unified Europe. 
In 1987, thirty years after the signing of the Treaties of 
Rome, a public opinion poll found that most Europeans in
5 Commission of the European Communities, EUR 12: 
Diagrams of the Enlarged Community, 1986, p. 12. "Happy 
Birthday," The Economist, March 21, 1987, p. 67.
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member-nations believed EC membership was good for their 
country. Furthermore, the majority also believed that the 
best way of preserving "national, cultural, historical 
identities" as well as the "national economic interests 
against the [challenges of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and 
Japan, was] for the countries of Europe to become truly 
united." People in every member-nation embraced 
unification as the best course that could be taken for 
Europe’s future.6 Yet, the inability of European 
governments to support the Europa project demonstrated that 
national governments could resist or ignore undertakings at 
their discretion, even if these efforts were undertaken to 
better Europe as a whole and were backed by Europe's 
leading IGOs. They had achieved Deutsch’s broad definition 
of integration because they had demonstrated agreement that 
"common social problems must and can be resolved by 
processes of peaceful change.”7 But while there had been 
some shifting of "loyalties, expectations, and political 
activities" toward European centers, by Haas' definition 
these traits had not shifted to a "new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre­
existing national states."8 National governments retained
6 "Poll Shows Popular Support of European Union," 
Europe, May 1987, pp. 28-29.
7Deutsch, Political Community, p. 5.
8 Haas, The Uniting, p. 16.
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jurisdiction over television policy. They appeared to be 
acting more like one of Etzioni's political systems with 
their activities interrelated rather than integrated.9 
While IGOs such as the EC intended to create a market 
"without frontiers,"10 nations retained ultimate 
sovereignty and in matters such as television reserved the 
right to resist pan-European efforts in favor of actions 
that benefittea the nation.
Lord Cockfield and others recognized the important 
place television had during this time in history. To him, 
it was a central factor in shaping the future of Europe.
As long as television remained under the control of 
national governments and television policy was nationally 
developed and administered, Europe would not achieve true 
unification.11 To underscore the importance of television 
to the Community, the EC declared 1988 "European Cinema and 
Television Year." Ripa di Meana explained that this 
declaration was made because television played "a leading 
role in drawing the European Community closer together and, 
therefore, in the construction of Europe."12
Television's impact was heightened by the
9Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 6-7.
10 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 1-5.
11 Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards,"
p. 16.
12"Europe to Celebrate Cinema and TV in 1988,"
Europe, May 1987, pp. 41-42.
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development of satellite communications which radically 
altered the nature of the television industry. In the pre­
satellite era, television signals were relayed in one of 
three ways, all of which were able to be controlled by 
national governments. The first two were over-the-air 
broadcast signals and microwave relays. Both had ranges 
that could be limited by the amount of power and other 
attributes assigned by the national governments. The third 
was cable television, which was totally regulated by each 
national government.13 However, communications by means of 
satellites could not easily be confined to a limited 
territory. Once transmitted, a satellite signal could be 
received with equal clarity and immediacy throughout a 
broad geographical area. The only significant controlling 
factor for satellite reception was the presence of proper 
reception equipment. Government control over reception of 
satellite communications was limited to its ability to 
regulate the availability of this reception equipment.14
Television played a role in Europe comparable to 
the role communication played in other organizations. This 
process paralleled the activity that took place in society 
when existing organizations merged. In this application,
13 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 11-
21.
14 Mark Lang, World Satellite Almanac, Second 
edition (Indianapolis: Howard W. Sams and Co., 1987), pp.
3-13.
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Europe was the organization to be created, and television 
was the communications medium for relaying information. 
Conveying information accurately, effectively, and in a 
timely manner, was vital to the health of an organization 
by those who studied organizational behavior.19 The 
character of communication exposed the genuine conditions 
within an organization. Ineffective communication or 
significant gaps in intraorganizational communication were 
symptomatic of deeper problems and pointed to deficiencies 
in the nature of internal relationships.16 The result of 
these deficiencies often was fragmentation, disunity, and a 
lack of cohesiveness. These factors prohibited the kind of 
coordination required for growth and full development.17
Integration theorists agreed that communication 
was vital to the integration process. Deutsch, for 
example, concluded that communication helped cultivate the 
"unifying habits and institutions" necessary for 
integration. People depended on "mutual communication and 
predictability" to avoid threats and develop an ability to 
"depend on each other" and "view each other as partners 
rather than as threats." Deutsch viewed communication as
19 Fred Luthans, Organizational Behavior (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 205.
16 Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 151.
17 Peter F. Drucker, Technology Management and 
Society (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977), p. 23.
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central to the existence of a "people,” which he defined as 
"a community of shared meanings," or a group who shared 
habits of communication. And while these habits most 
often were formed among people with the same language, he 
concluded that "sometimes the common culture and 
communication habits, which make a people, may even spread 
to form a nation among groups that speak different 
languages." Thus to Deutsch the problem that many 
languages were spoken within a region did not present an 
insurmountable obstacle to integration. Deutsch also wrote 
that the "processes of communication are the basis of the 
coherence of societies, cultures, and even of the 
personalities of individuals." Communication facilitated 
the experience of a common history and perspective on 
events by a people, which helped unite them and give them 
a more shared world view.18 A major characteristic of 
membership in a group is "the ability to communicate more 
effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with 
members of one large group than with outsiders."19 Deutsch 
also drew attention to Norbert Wiener's comment that 
communication was "the cement that makes organizations. 
Communication alone enables a group to think together, to
18 Karl Deutsch, Political Community at the 
International Level (New York: Archon Books, 1970), pp.
13, 33, 41, 58.
19 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social 
Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953), pp.
61, 70-71.
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see together, and to act together."20 Perhaps as much as 
it played a role in the establishment and fostering of 
integrated societies, the regulation or impeding of 
communication in many cases prevented integration. 
Communication patterns, habits, and activities could be 
contained to a significant degree to sources within 
national boundaries. Such controls reenforced past or 
existing loyalties and acted in some cases as barriers to 
integration, tending to limit interaction and prevent the 
exchanges required to achieve integration.21 Etzioni 
wrote that communication networks were indispensable for 
organizations and became more important the larger and more 
complex the organization. Information had to flow 
vertically through every level as well as horizontally from 
one part of the organization to another.
Television proved to be an important communications 
medium for Europe. Nation-states and European IGOs both 
sought increased jurisdiction over television policy. For 
the most part, television policy control remained with 
national governments. As the EP concluded, these controls 
tended to reenforce national allegiances. Citizens watched 
television programs produced or selected by and telecast
2 0 Cybernetics, cited in James E. Dougherty and 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1981), p. 424.
21Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.
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from organizations within that nation. They listened to 
radio programs and read books, newspapers, and magazines 
originating in their nation. The focus centered on 
national life, and perspectives developed within that 
framework. These communication activities created the 
"unifying habits and institutions" Deutsch used to 
describe the integration process.22 But since the focus of 
these habits and institutions was the nation, these 
activities reenforced national rather than European 
integration. While the nation-states of Europe enjoyed 
unity through their internal communication, nationally 
controlled television prevented continental integration 
efforts. They, in fact, established the communications 
barriers to integration to which Deutsch referred.23 
Those, such as the EC, who sought a European consciousness 
and integration realized that this system had to be changed 
and these barriers broken if Europe was to be unified.
Thus both those desiring to retain national sovereignty and 
those desiring greater integration recognized the 
importance television had on life in Europe.
As a communications medium, television had 
demonstrated the ability to influence the nature of society 
itself. The power of this medium was observed by many 
noted analysts of trends in society. Marshall McLuhan, one
22Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
2 aDeutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.
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of the most influential analysts of communications, 
concluded that the introduction of television to society 
changed the way people acted and related to each other. It 
was a communications medium that affected nations and 
cultures and changed the character of organizations 
because it changed the relationships of people.24
In explaining why television was deemed of such 
importance to society, futurist Alvin Toffler, one of the 
most widely read thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s, pointed 
to the role it played in creating every person’s images of 
reality. Images were formed "out of the signals of 
information reaching us" from every part of the 
environment, including the mass media. When this 
environment changed, image formation was modified. Changes 
in communications media during the twentieth century 
significantly altered the way these images were formed.23 
The introduction of new communications technology 
transformed the role of communications in society and with 
these changes altered modern culture itself.26 Toffler 
identified three primary waves in the development of 
communications technology. The first encompassed the
24 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: 
Signet Books, 1964), p. 152.
23 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1980), p. 145.
26Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantom
Books, 1970), pp. 280-2.
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years before mass media were developed when a limited range 
of input such as neighbors, family, oral history, and 
personal experiences shaped world images. The second wave 
incorporated the development of the mass media. The 
creation of images was freed from dependence on the 
immediate environment since books, newspapers, magazines, 
radio, and television expanded the signals reaching people. 
In Europe, these media were usually oriented toward local 
or national perspectives, reenforcing models of reality 
centered on nation-states. The third wave was shaped by 
the introduction of such innovations as computers, video 
and audio tapes, cable television, and satellites. These 
innovations altered the way images were formed and resulted 
in increased choices for the individual. With more sources 
available, people could select information and 
entertainment that satisfied their individual interests and 
standards. While during the second wave Europeans received 
images influenced by nationally-oriented mass media, images 
in the third wave were received from an increasing number 
of sources from throughout the continent. The advent of 
the third wave came while people who had grown up during 
the second wave held dominant governmental positions in 
Europe. The changing media environment affected these 
people, as they yearned for the "ideological certainties of 
the past" and were "annoyed and disoriented by the 
information blitz of the new era." These people wanted to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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retain the controls and certainty of the past, and resisted 
changes brought on by the third wave. This meant that 
national governments attempted to maintain the same level 
of control over media as they had before satellites.27
Other studies confirmed the importance of 
television to modern society. For example, John Naisbitt, 
in his influential book, Megatrends. described western 
civilization's shift from an industrial base to a society 
primarily based on information. This shift began in 1956, 
the first year more Americans were employed in the 
information sector rather than in the production of goods. 
Naisbitt pointed to 1957 as "the beginning of the 
globalization of the information revolution," when the 
Soviet Union launched Sputnik I. This also was the year in 
which the EC was founded, reflecting Europe's participation 
in the shift to more global perspectives. Expanding on 
McLuhan's belief that television would lead to "the global 
village," Naisbitt predicted that it would be the marriage 
of television with satellite technology that would lead to 
this era. Satellite television, with its capability to 
relay messages to vast areas of the world with 
unprecedented immediacy and quality, created the potential 
for vast socioeconomical and political change.28
27Toffler, The Third Wave, pp. 145-154.
28 John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner
Books, 1982), pp. 12-13.
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One of the leading theorists on global trends in 
business. Harvard Professor Theodore Levitt, believed that 
developments in communications technologies were primary 
causes of changes in the structure of business as well as 
society in general. Hass communications pressured 
established market segments and national controls in 
Europe, resulting in expanded consumer awareness and 
increased demand for diverse products. In spite of this 
pressure, European nations through the mid-1980s 
maintained tight controls over radio and television 
signals. Yet Levitt predicted that national governments 
were fighting a losing battle. He concluded that "in the 
past barriers against superior technologies and better 
economics have always fallen," and that the superior 
technology of mass communications, particularly television, 
would result in a more integrated European market.29
Television demonstrated the power to influence the 
relationships of people to each other. While nation-states 
exercised considerable control over television before the 
satellite era, satellites introduced a new dimension to the 
medium. Fulfilling part of Haas* definition of 
integration,30 satellite television became an environmental 
factor that helped shift the expectations of Europeans
29Theodore Levitt, The Marketing Imagination (New 
York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 20, 31-32.
30Haas, The Uniting, p. 16.
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toward centers outside of their own nation. It also 
created greater interdependence among peoples and market 
segments throughout Europe, as Etzioni contended would take 
place in the first phase of unification. Television, 
particularly through satellites, offered the means through 
which communication throughout Europe could be more 
integrated, in turn leading to a more integrated Europe.
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CHAPTER III 
TELEVISION AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: 
REENFORCING THE ANCIENT LOYALTIES
If communication developed the "unifying habits and 
institutions" necessary for integration,1 nationally- 
controlled television activities provided ample evidence 
that the nations of Europe were more interested in 
strengthening their own national integration than in 
encouraging the unification of Europe. They became aware 
that television brought with it the power to change 
relationships2 as well as to influence the nature of images 
individuals formed toward politics, commercial products, 
fashion, and other aspects of society.3 Therefore 
television policy throughout Europe was developed along 
national lines, with distinctive policies even in 
neighboring countries.
Television service began in most European countries
deutsch. Political Community, p. 33.
2McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 152
3Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 145.
29
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in the decade between 1944 and 1954. For example, 
television service started in France in 1944, in the U.K. 
in 1946, in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952, and in 
Italy in 1953. Strong government control and supervision 
were constant in each nation, but the exact nature of this 
control varied. The following sections summarize the 
development of television in each of the nations of western 
Europe.
Austria
Austria had two television services, 0RF1 and 0RF2, 
both operated by Osterreichischer Rundfunk (ORF), the state 
broadcasting authority. Both stations carried advertising. 
Austria encouraged the development of cable television, 
particularly following 1977 when distribution of foreign 
programs in the country was legalized. It also 
participated in the development of some pan-European 
satellite communications projects.4
Belgium
Belgium had a television policy that reflected its 
political status as a nation sharply divided over language. 
A 1963 law established four regions to govern the country, 
with the divisions based primarily on language differences. 
The areas were those regions where the Flemish (Dutch), 
Walloon (French), and German populations were concentrated,
“■Gray, Cable Television, pp. 80-81.
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with the capital of Brussels given special status.9 While 
all broadcasting was considered a public service with 
national implications, three separate institutions were 
given jurisdiction over television policy: Radio
T&l&vision Beige de la Communaut6 Culturell Frangaise 
(RTBF) for the Walloon community; Belgische Radio en 
Televisie (BRT) for the Flemish community; and Belgisches 
Rundfunk und Fernsehzentrum fur deutschsprachige Sendungen 
(BRF) for the Germany community. Each were public 
corporations governed by a board of directors appointed by 
the minister of cultural affairs for the appropriate 
language group. All finances were overseen by the 
national government. No advertising was permitted. The 
RTBF and BRF granted television time to private, non-profit 
organizations which met the criteria established by law.6
Belgium had the highest penetration of cable 
television households of any nation in Europe, with nearly 
ninety percent of its households wired for cable 
reception.7 However, its policy of no advertising on 
television meant that television services based elsewhere 
in Europe that carried advertising were not permitted on 
systems in Belgium. Pressure mounted through the 1980s for
’Gray, Cable Television, p. 83.
6 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 74-75.
7"Belgium: the Programmers' Battlefield," Cable
and Satellite Europe, September 1986, p. 15.
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Belgium to reverse this policy, particularly since it was 
the home nation for the EC. Belgium's intricate 
governmental structure mandated that each language-centered 
regional government had to approve new legal frameworks.8
In Flanders, the process of new media law 
development brought the region close to a new law in 1987. 
The new policy called for a new Flemish commercial 
television station with several restrictions in ownership 
and program content. Expressing a concern for the Flemish 
and overall Belgium culture, the new policy was to demand 
that a significant percentage of television channels 
carried on cable systems in the area be Flemish.9 Similar 
action was expected in Walloonia with corresponding 
protection for the Walloon culture. Progress toward a more 
open commercial policy remained in study.10
Some satellite television services were allowed 
into Belgium, but they had to agree to commit to program 
production in Belgium through a minimum investment 
arrangement administered by the government.11
Belgian television policies changed during the
8"Belgium Stalls on Media Law," Cable and Satellite 
Europe, June 1985, p. 33.
9 "Government Moves on Flemish Private Channel," 
Cable and Satellite Express, June 26, 1987, p. 4.
10"Programmers Battlefield," Cable and Satellite 
Europe, June 1985, p. 15.
11 Ibid.
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1980s, but the country's political and social climate 
continued to dominate television policy. The divisions and 
conflicts between the Flemish and Walloon areas in 
particular overshadowed most other political activities. 
Belgians seemed to be more concerned about the protection 
of their own cultures than with encouraging television 
services from other nations, or with television activities 
that might encourage European integration.
Denmark
Denmark was one of the staunch advocates of 
government monopoly over television activities. Danmarks 
Radio had the exclusive rights to television distribution 
in Denmark, and was Denmark's only television service. All 
advertising was prohibited.12 However, after many years of 
intense debate this situation changed in early 1986. At 
that time the Danish government approved the creation of a 
new television station, which was to be supported by 
advertising. The new station was to be overseen by a five- 
member board selected by the Danish Ministry of Culture, 
which intended to maintain a public service focus rather 
than allow the station to become focused on the 
presentation of entertainment programs.13
Other changes were also made in a modest
12 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 98.
13 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Denmark,"
Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 20.
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liberalization program. In early 1987, the Danish 
government for the first time approved the reception of 
satellite television services by cable systems in Denmark. 
This was part of Denmark's on-going effort to provide 
extensive cable service throughout the country. It was 
projected that by the early 1990s 80 percent of Danish 
households would have cable television.14
Denmark was typical of the nations of Europe which 
reluctantly embraced satellite television. It opened its 
borders to satellite services and endorsed advertising as a 
legitimate form of supporting television service only after 
years of resistance. Yet, Denmark remained concerned about 
protecting its culture, and maintain a cautious approach to 
the introduction of new services and the approval of 
advertising.
Finland
Finland's state broadcasting company, Oy Yleisradio 
(YLE), owned and operated two television stations, YLE-1 
and YLE-2, both supported by subscriptions. YLE leased 
time to an independent company, Oy Mainos TV Reklam Ab 
(MTV), which aired advertising-backed programs. A third 
channel was started in 1986 as a joint venture between YLE 
and MTV. More than half of the homes in Finland were 
connected to master antennae (MATV) system. In MATV set-
14"Denmark Opens Up," Cable and Satellite Express, 
April 3, 1987, p. 1.
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ups, one master antennae received programming from 
television services and then transmitted the signals 
through cables to dwelling units for viewing in individual 
households. Cable television was also encouraged.
Reception of satellite television from other nations and 
purchase of home satellite dishes were allowed with few 
restrictions.19 Finland was a minor partner with Sweden 
and Norway in a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) project 
called Tele-X which was conceived as a means of providing 
television service to the remote populations throughout the 
region. However, its involvement was tempered by concern 
about the Soviet Union. Finland desired to stay on good 
terms with this giant neighbor, and therefore proceeded 
cautiously with commercial and satellite television 
projects.1 6
France
The 1980s were a time of challenge and change for 
the mass media in France. Since the inception of official 
television service, television had been a state monopoly, 
and as such was accused of being used, often blatantly, by 
the ruling government for its own ends. Charles de Gaulle 
once said, "My opponents have much of the press on their
13 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Finish New 
Media: On Ice?," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p.
22.
16 Taylor, "Battle," pp. 32-33.
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side, so I keep television." His successor, Georges 
Pompidou, also expressed the view that television was 
important not just as a political instrument but also as a 
resource for the preservation of French culture. He said, 
"French television is the Voice of France," and wanted to 
retain as much control of it as possible.17
The organization responsible for television between 
1964 and 1974, the Office de Radiodiffusion-T616vision 
Frangaise (ORTF), was often charged with bias, subjected to 
strikes, and in 1974 was replaced by seven more independent 
companies financed by the state: four overseeing broad­
casting programming (three for television programs and one 
for radio) ; the Soci6t6 Frangaise de Production (respon­
sible for all radio and television production); the 
Institut de 1'Audiovisual (for training of professionals 
for audio-visual work); and T61&diffusion de France or TDF. 
TDF provided general oversight of all broadcasting activi­
ties. However, this arrangement did not end complaints. 
Groups and individuals from all political philosophies 
levied attacks on government control.18
After the election of Socialist Frangois Mitterrand 
as President in 1981, French media policies changed. A new 
audiovisual law, passed in 1982, established a nine-member
17Roger Williams, "France: A Revolution in the
Making," Channels, September 1985, p. 60.
18 Gray, Cable Television, p. 97.
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supervisory group, the Haute Autorit£, to oversee all 
broadcasting activities. This structure, however, was 
subject to the same criticisms of political favoritism as 
previous procedures.19
TDF itself, as a public corporation, was governed 
by a sixteen member board, including representatives from 
Parliament and the High Authority for Audio-Visual 
Communications. The three networks overseen by TDF were: 
T§16vision Frangaise 1 (TF 1), Antenne 2 (A 2), and France- 
R6gions 3 (FR 3). A separate organization, the R6gie 
Frangaise de Publicity (RFP), attracted advertising and 
produced commercials. Slightly more than half of RFP was 
owned by the government, with the remainder owned by 
representatives of the advertising industry, the press, 
consumers, and another French state holding company, the 
Soci6t§ Financi^re de Radiodiffusion, or Sofirad. Regard­
less of claims of independence, representatives of the 
state were involved in each of these organizations, provid­
ing state direction, both subtle and direct.20
Mitterrand led France into the era of pay tele­
vision by approving the development of Canal Plus, a sub­
scription television (STV) service delivered via micro­
waves to dwelling units paying for descrambling equipment.
19 Ibid., p. 98.
20 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 89-
91.
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But one of the biggest surprises of his government came in 
May of 1985, when Prime Minister Laurent Fabius announced 
that France was going to embrace private television, with 
expanded advertising acceptability, new national services, 
and sixty-two local services.21 The new national services 
were to be called La Cinq, TV6, and TV7.22
More furor was created in November 1985 when the 
government awarded the license for La Cinq to a conglo­
merate controlled by Italian media mogul Silvio Berlusconi 
and French industrialist J6rome Seydoux. In addition, 
British media multi-millionaire, Robert Maxwell was given a 
license to operate an English-language service on the high 
powered TDF-1 satellite France was developing. Simulta­
neously, the government refused to honor a commitment it 
had previously made to award a transponder on this satel­
lite to Luxembourg's CLT. Within the same week, a bill was 
pushed through a sparsely attended National Assembly which 
allowed the government to use the Eifel Tower and other 
buildings for television transmission purposes. This bill 
infuriated Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, a political 
adversary and ideological opposite of Mitterrand.23
21 "French TV Begins to Take New Shape," Cable and 
Satellite Express, May 31, 1985, p. 16.
22 Claire Wilson, "Crisis Looms Over French TV," 
Advertising Age, March 10, 1986, p. 56.
23"Political Furor Sweeping France," Variety, 
November 27, 1985, pp. 121, 135.
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Television policy became one of the major issues of 
the French elections of 1986, and continued as a major 
political matter following the election when Chirac became 
prime minister, setting up an unprecedented scenario in 
France— a Socialist president, Mitterrand, had a 
Conservative prime minister, Chirac. One of the first 
actions of Chirac's government was to cancel franchises 
awarded for TDF-1 transponders, and establish a new, 
independent organization, called the CNCL, to oversee the 
implementation of private television in France. In July
1986, the government revoked the licenses given to La Cinq 
and TV6. However, a new communications bill was debated 
throughout 1986, and the outcome remained clouded by 
continuing uncertainty, as well as shifting political and 
market forces.24 In spite of this on-going turmoil, France 
continued to develop its TDF-1 high powered satellite 
project, which was to have been launched in 1986, but was 
delayed for technical and financial reasons. Early in
1987, Finance Minister Alain Juppe concluded that TDF-1 was 
too expensive to launch and operate. Since this project 
was developed in cooperation with West Germany, concerns 
were raised about the consequences of delaying the project. 
Eventually its continued development was approved.23
24"Compromises on French Media Law," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, August 1986, p. 5.
2 s"Political Storm Brewing for TDF," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, March 1987, p. 8.
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To add to this complex domestic television 
environment, in 1985 two EP members took the French 
government into the European Court of Justice on the charge 
that French media laws violated the Treaty of Rome, which 
established the EC.26
The French were one of the most visible and vocal 
participants in the development of European IGOs and 
projects for the strengthening of Europe's position in 
international political and economical spheres. They were 
a leading force in the evolution of pan-European television 
activity as well. But French television policies were 
marked by lingering internal political disputes, and their 
television policies changed several times. They also 
seemed to remain more concerned about protecting their 
culture and language than advancing European integration 
through television.
Federal Republic of Germany
Like Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) took a regional approach to television policy in 
conformation with its federal system of government. Author­
ity for German television policy was designated specifi­
cally to the eleven Lander, or states. Acting alone or 
together with other Lander, the government of each Land 
assigned responsibility for broadcasting within its region
26"EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, September 1985, p. 6.
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to a non-profit public corporation. Nine regional tele­
vision stations were established, with a tenth— Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF)— established under an agreement 
among the states. Each station was independent, with 
limited government supervision. They were managed by 
broadcasting and administrative boards which included 
representatives of the major political, religious, and 
philosophical groups in the state.27
West Germany designated three channels for use by 
its individual stations. Channel One was a national 
service conducted as a joint venture among the nine 
regional stations. Its programming consisted of a mix of 
programs from individual stations coordinated by the 
association of public broadcasting corporations (ARD). ZDF 
broadcasted on Channel Two. Channel Three was dedicated to 
broadcasts of five different regional services.28
This regional organizational structure was created 
following World War II and was designed to prevent the 
domination of Germany by one person or group, as Hitler and 
the National Socialists had done. While this structure 
prevented political dominance by one group, it also pre­
vented or limited the development and implementation of 
national television policies, and delayed German partici­
27 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 94-
95.
2 8 Ibid., p. 95.
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pation in the satellite television explosion of the 1980s. 
While Lander control remained in effect for television, the 
national post office (or Bundespost) retained a monopoly on 
the installation of cable television as well as all post 
and telecommunications services.29
This complicated arrangement caused numerous 
attempts to work out new ways to approach the issue of 
satellite television within West Germany. Years of nego­
tiations resulted in a new treaty signed on April 3, 1987, 
by the media representatives of each Land. The treaty 
provided for the creation of private television in West 
Germany, to coexist with public television. Yet Germany 
remained a long way from achieving a fully integrated 
policy toward television.30
In the face of these internal obstacles, West 
Germany remained active in the creation of a new satellite 
service for Europe. In a joint project with France, the 
Germans planned to launch a service called TV-SAT, with a 
satellite technology duplicating France's projected TDF-1 
satellite. The German satellite was scheduled to beam 
programming in German to Germany and was not designed to 
reach the greater European market.31
29Gray, Cable Television, p. 106.
30"Media Treaty Signed," Cable and Satellite 
Express, Vol. 4, No. 7, p. 4.
31 Chapman, New Media, p. 17.
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Although West Germany became Europe's strongest 
economic power after World War II, its own governmental 
fragmentation within its federal system significantly 
contributed to its slow growth in cable television as well 
as to its inability to take a leadership role in tele­
vision. In contrast to such smaller countries as 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, West Germany had such 
complex media regulations that it had not played as 
significant a role as one would assume from a nation of its 
size and economic clout. Germans, in a sense, spent their 
energies on being integrated in their own nation and were 
not concerned about the problems of European integration 
through satellite communications.
Greece
According to the Greek Constitution of 1975, tele­
vision was "under the immediate control of the State."
This provision was made to assure news and information 
reports that were impartial by the government’s standards, 
and to assure that program quality and content were in line 
with the "social mission and the cultural development of 
the country." This policy was in accord with the Greek 
government’s socialist orientation. Greek law established 
two organizations to operate television stations: Elliniki
Radiophonia Tileorasses (ERT 1 -Greek Radio and Television) 
and Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassis (ERT 2). ERT 1 was 
financed by a broadcasting fee levied on all television
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sets and advertising, while ERT 2 was funded from the 
national budget and through advertising. The board of 
directors of ERT 1 consisted of seven members appointed by 
the cabinet, while ERT 2 was managed by a five member board 
appointed by the Ministry of the Presidency.32 Greece was 
not active in the development of cable television and did 
not play a major role in pan-European satellite efforts.
Ireland
Ireland's national broadcasting organization, Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE), was the only organization licensed 
for television service in Ireland by its Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs. It operated two television stations (RTE-1 
and RTE-2), both of which accepted advertising. Advertis­
ing accounted for slightly less than half of its revenues. 
RTE also received substantial funding from the Irish 
Parliament out of funds designated for the Ministry. The 
authority for the RTE was vested in a nine-member board 
appointed by the government.33
Cable television installations increased during the 
early 1980s. However, most of the cable systems were 
capable of receiving only six channels, and those six 
channels were almost exclusively reserved for BBC-1, BBC-2,
32Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp.
101-3.
33 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 86-
87.
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and Channel Four from the U.K., Ulster TV from Northern 
Ireland, and RTE-1 and RTE-2. Few of Ireland's cabled 
households received any of the satellite television 
networks, and major rebuilding of the cable systems was 
required for this situation to change.34
In spite of its relatively small size, Ireland took 
steps to become one of Europe's most advanced telecommuni­
cations centers in the 1980s. In December 1986, its 
government approved the construction of the Eiresat satel­
lite system. Eiresat was to be a high-powered satellite 
with five channels capable of being seen throughout 
Ireland, the U.K., and the western part of continental 
Europe. The satellite was also to be used by the RTE.33 
Ireland determined to enter the satellite era in an 
aggressive way.36
Italy
Frequent leadership changes and corresponding 
shifts in national policy were characteristic of post World 
War II Italy. Television policy was no less unstable. Yet 
by the mid-1980s, while the rest of Europe only gradually 
expanded the number of available television services and 
studied increased television privitization, Italy had more
34 O'Connor, "Ireland,” p. 29.
33Lang, World Satellite Almanac, pp. 229-30.
36 Vanessa O'Connor, "Ireland's Satellite Jig,"
Cable and Satellite Europe, August 1986, pp. 28-29.
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than 600 television stations, most of which were private.
Prior to the 1970s, Radiotelevisione Italians (RAI) 
monopolized airwaves with its state-owned public service 
programming. However, on April 30, 1971, a local cable 
network began operating in the small, northwestern Italy 
city of Biella. In the next few years, other networks 
began similar operations elsewhere in Italy. In 1974 the 
Italian minister of communication ruled these networks 
illegal, but in July of that year the Constitutional Court 
of Italy decreed them legal. In 1976 the court extended 
this freedom of operation to over-the-air, broadcasting 
stations, spawning a massive growth in available television 
services. Due in part to the many changes in government, 
no media law was passed to take the place of the one re­
jected by the court in 1974. Most of the 600-plus 
stations attracted compar atively small audiences, and the 
three RAI stations, RAI One, RAI Two, and RAI Three, 
remained the only official national television services.
In 1980 Silvio Berlusconi started the first of his 
"national networks" through distribution of videocassettes 
to stations throughout Italy. By 1986 he had amassed three 
networks: Canale Cinque, Italia Uno, and Retequattro.
Other networks were created through similar packaging of 
local stations, principal among which were Euro-TV, Rete A, 
and Video Music. Tele Monte Carlo from Monaco was allowed 
to be telecast in Italy through special arrangement with
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the Italian government.37
A legal battle continued in Italy based on RAI's 
legal position as the "only legitimate operator of national 
broadcasting,” a definition affirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in 1981.38 The court ruled that other organizations 
could not create national networks, and in 1984 a Turin 
judge ruled that the networks operated by Berlusconi were 
violating the law. These networks were allowed to continue
operations at least until appeals could be filed. A state
holding company, Instituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale (IRI), held 99.55% of all RAI shares. Adver­
tising since 1972 was the responsibility of the Societa 
Publicita Radiofonica e Televisiva (SIPRA), wnich was a 
profit-making public company. Government monopoly of 
national television service was justified due to the need 
to provide "essential public service of pre-eminent general 
interest." However, the ministry for posts and telecom­
munications was ordered to grant licenses with only three 
major stipulations: (1) advertising could not exceed five
percent of total airtime; (2) local stations could not be 
linked into national"networks; and (3) station operators 
had to produce at least half of their own programs.39
3 7 "More Channels than Dishes," Cable and Satellite 
Europe, August 1986, p. 13.
38Gray, Cable Television, p. 115.
39 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 65-
67.
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Italian television emphasized multiple consumer 
choices before the dawn of the satellite era. Court 
actions in the 1970s created a deregulated environment, 
resulting in the development of more stations than any 
other nation in Europe. However, some observers concluded 
from the Italian experience that Europe must continue to 
regulate television activities and that government controls 
over television were needed.40
Luxembourg
Luxembourg, with a population of under 400,000 and 
a territory of only 998 square miles, became one of the 
most influential nations in Europe concerning television. 
Much of its disproportional influence stemmed from its 
government's approach to television. Authority was given 
to a public company, known as Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de 
Telediffusion (CLT), with a commission to make a financial 
profit. CLT did business under the name of Radio-Tele- 
Luxembourg (RTL). RTL paid the Luxembourg government 
levies based on its license fees as well as a fee for 
continuing its status as a monopoly.41
Luxembourg was characterized by one observer as 
Europe's "main 'offshore' TV broadcaster, beaming commer-
40 Jean-Marie Cavada, speech delivered at the 
Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, 
October 16, 1986.
41 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 63-
64.
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cial TV and radio services into neighboring countries and 
making its advertising money on the basis of foreign 
audiences.”42 CLT had more freedom and authority than most 
European broadcasting organizations. In contrast to 
countries like the Netherlands where broadcasting control 
was vested in organizations concerned with preserving the 
national culture, CLT had primarily commercial aims. Most 
of its viewing audience came from Luxembourg's more 
populated neighboring countries. It programmed in the 
Luxembourgian language only about an hour a day, otherwise 
televising in French for its main RTL service and in German 
for its RTL-Plus service.43 Ownership of CLT was pan- 
European, split among several private firms and 
governmental groups, including the Soci6t6 G£n6rale de 
Belgique, Agency Havas (France), and the Banque 
Internationale k Luxembourg.44
As a result of its more commercial, less restric­
tive approach to television, Luxembourg had headquartered 
several television ventures, including CLT itself, with the 
goal of broadcasting to audiences throughout Europe. In the 
satellite era, Luxembourg became home to the Coronet
42"Time of Reckoning for CLT," Cable and Satellite 
Europe, September 1986, p. 23.
43 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 63-
64.
44"Reckoning," Cable and Satellite Europe,
September 1986, p. 23.
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project, conceived in 1983, as the first private pan- 
European satellite television service. Coronet was 
established in Luxembourg in part because the government 
promised significant political and technical support. The 
Luxembourg government later took over more control of 
Coronet through an organization called the Soci§t6 
Europ&enne des Satellites (SES).49 Coronet ceased to exist 
in 1984, due to mounting costs and organizational diffi­
culties. However, SES sustained the essence of this 
concept in a project begun in 1985 called "Astra." Astra 
was backed by fourteen partners from throughout Europe 
dedicated to private satellite-delivered television to the 
continent.4 6
Ironically, even though the government of 
Luxembourg was involved in these independent ventures, it 
continued to support public pan-European television and 
satellite enterprises. But it was criticized for this 
apparent double-mindedness. Luxembourg’s sponsorship of 
Coronet and Astra projects caused political trouble with 
other European nations and IGOs. It was publicly chastised 
by Eutelsat, which claimed a monopoly on international 
television distribution in Europe.47 Eutelsat President
4 3 Ibid., p. 33.
46Soci6t6 Europ6ene des Satellites, Sales brochure, 
(Luxembourg: SES, 1985).
47 Simon Lloyd, "Eutelsat Closes Ranks," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, August 1984, p. 10.
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Andrea Caruso called it "inconceivable that a government 
with a strong commitment to Europeanism" like Luxembourg 
could support such inde- pendent ventures.48
Differences in television policy caused conflicts 
between Luxembourg and Prance as well. A 1984 agreement 
between the two countries assured the RTL two transponders 
on a new satellite being developed by the French.49 
However, in 1986 that agreement was nullified by French 
President Mitterrand, who awarded the transponders to other 
organizations. Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jacques Santer 
said this "blatant" violation badly damaged "the spirit of 
confidence" between the two countries. The continuing 
differences over television developments increased tensions 
between these nations.30
In many ways Luxembourg embraced integration, but 
its willingness to encourage private television ventures 
indicated its continuing commitment to an independent 
course in Europe.
Monaco
Even though Monaco occupied less than one square 
mile of territory and had fewer than 30,000 inhabitants,
48Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back," 
Cable and Satellite Europe. March 1987, p. 40.
49 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 64.
" A l a n  Osborn, "Dispute Over Airwaves," Europe,
June 1986, p. 8.
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its broadcasting activities exercised influence throughout 
Europe. Radio Monte Carlo broadcast in more than twenty 
languages and was heard throughout the world. Its 
government-owned, commercial television station, Tele Monte 
Carlo, was viewed by audiences in France and Italy, where 
the governments authorized its reception. Monaco was not 
involved in any European satellite television developments. 
Because of its unique tax and business climate, it served a 
role in southern Europe somewhat similar to Luxembourg's in 
northern Europe as a haven for commercial broadcasting with 
limited government interference and regulations.31
The Netherlands
Television in the Netherlands was controlled by the 
Dutch Broadcasting Foundation ("Nederlandse Omroep 
Stichting," or NOS), which was considered a public law 
foundation, governed by a board of directors. Half of the 
board was appointed by private Dutch broadcasting organi­
zations, with the other half split between appointees of 
Dutch cultural organizations and the Dutch minister for 
cultural affairs. The NOS had to allocate television time 
to broadcasting organizations, political parties, and 
religious organizations which met criteria in demonstrating 
public demand for their programs. When an organization 
reached a certain level of memberships, it qualified for
si"Foreign Broadcasting Chart,” Variety, April 15, 
1987, p. 150.
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air time. Groups with larger membership bases received 
more desirable air time. Operations were financed by a mix 
of license fees, contributions from broadcasting organi­
zations, and advertising, which was regulated by the 
Foundation for Broadcast Advertising.32
Cable television in the Netherlands was legalized 
in 1965. From the beginning the Dutch sought to make cable 
and broadcast television a servant of the public good, 
rather than a source of profit. To be cabled, a community 
had to demonstrate that at least 70 percent of its citizens 
wanted cable television. Local government municipalities 
exercised a significant control over programming content as 
well as operations of each cable system.33 For example, 51 
percent of the 300,000 subscriber system in Amsterdam was 
owned by the city of Amsterdam, with 48 percent owned by an 
organization of local housing associations.34
Cable television systems in the Netherlands were 
allowed to retransmit television programming services from 
other European countries. However, to be carried on Dutch 
cable systems, non-Dutch services had to comply with strict 
standards. Dutch laws prohibited the reception of tele­
vision signals (whether in the form of programs or adver­
32 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 69-
70.
33 Gray, Cable Television, pp. 119-20.
34 Michael Chapman and David Wood, The New Media 
Review (London: Ogilvie and Mather, 1984), p. 22.
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tising) which were aimed exclusively at the Netherlands.
The goal of this policy was the protection of the Dutch 
culture from outside influences. In 1984, after intense 
review, the Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural 
Affairs issued a revised policy document which summarized 
revisions required because of technological developments 
such as satellite communications and cable television.
This document outlined three fundamental tasks to which the 
Dutch government was committed: (1) protecting the freedom
and diversity of its media; (2) protecting and increasing 
the awareness of Dutch cultural achievements; and (3) 
expanding the number of programming choices for the 
consumer.3 3
While the government expressed its desire to 
satisfy consumer demand for more choice, this ranked lower 
in priority than the protection of the Dutch media and 
culture. The government was dedicated to preserve the 
Dutch way of life and to control television in order to 
accomplish this. It determined to protect everything "old 
and deeply rooted" in its society worth saving and 
revitalizing. Commercialism could be increased to respond 
to popular demand for increased programming choices. 
However, the government warned that technology must not be 
allowed to rule society. The government vowed to
33 Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural 
Affairs, Policy Document on the Media (The Netherlands, 
1984), p. 2.
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"guarantee protection of those values which, in the light 
of its other policies, it does not wish to expose to 
untrammeled social and technical development." To the 
government, these values were more important than 
commercial gain or blind acquiescence to pan-Europeanism. 
Television was important to further Dutch culture and 
events in European television were potential threats to the 
health of this culture. Overall Dutch "values, firms and 
products" lost ground to other influences and developments 
"detrimental to our culture, employment and store of 
knowledge." The Dutch vowed to fight this erosion through 
financial and legal means that would aid Dutch companies 
and individuals, and its overall society. This concern for 
the protection of Dutch autonomy did not mean the closing 
of Dutch frontiers, but the government warned that foreign 
programmers would be required to comply with Dutch laws, 
including the prohibition of advertising aimed at the 
Netherlands. The government remained adamant on this 
point. For them, involvement in pan-European or regional 
television ventures was conditional on the prohibition of 
this kind of advertising and the protection of Dutch 
culture.5 6
At the same time, the Dutch remained active in the 
development of pan-European satellite television. They 
were the host country for Europa and participated in other
3 6 Ibid., pp. 10, 17-20.
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pan-European television undertakings. They remained, 
however, preeminently concerned about protecting their 
culture and heritage, apparently holding these in higher 
regard than European integration. Some saw these
commitments as contradictory. For example, Dutch EP
member, Gijs de Vries, argued successfully before the 
European Court of Justice that Dutch protectionism violated 
the Treaty of Rome which established the EC. The Court 
agreed with his argument and ordered the Dutch government 
to change its media laws to comply with the Treaty.37 This
and other challenges to Dutch policies were forcing the
Netherlands to decide how much of their heritage and 
tradition they were willing to forsake. How willingly 
would they conform to European standards instead of 
protecting their own? Their answer was to determine how 
the Netherlands fit into Europe's future.
Norway
Norway had one of the most restrictive television 
policies in Europe. Its one television station operated 
without advertising and had careful government oversight. 
Yet Norway became a leader in the use of satellites to 
bring television to its sparsely populated northern 
region.38 Through its 15 percent ownership in the Tele-X
37 Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.
38 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "The Norwegian 
Picture," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 16.
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DBS satellite project it developed with Sweden and Finland, 
Norway hoped to expand its service to this remote 
territory.59
The creation of a second television station and the 
approval of advertising were subjects that were hotly 
debated throughout the 1980s. Socialists favored retaining 
an advertising ban, while Conservatives sought expanded 
commercialism and advertising on the broadcast media. 
Overall, Norway remained cautious regarding television 
expansion. The government was aware that the nation 
historically lived in the shadow of its more powerful 
neighbors, principally Sweden. While seeking practical 
relations in various projects of the Scandinavian 
countries, Norway was conservative in its media policies as 
its way of preserving its culture and guarding against too 
great an influence from Sweden and other countries.60
Portugal
Portugal joined the EC in 1986, ending years of 
relative isolation from the rest of Europe. Television had 
always been state-owned and controlled, although 
advertising was permitted. The state's broadcasting 
administrator, the RTVP, owned two stations, TVP-1 and TVP- 
2. A proposal was before the government to allow private
59Doreen Taylor, "Battle in the Sky Over 
Scandinavia," Broadcast, October 31, 1986, pp. 32-33.
60 Baker, "Norwegian," p. 16.
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stations in the country. It had not encouraged the devel­
opment of cable television and did not actively pursue 
satellite communications for Portugal.61
Spain
Spain emerged from decades of dominance by 
Francisco Franco upon his death in 1975. Television, like 
most other aspects of Spanish life, had been tightly 
controlled by Franco's government. With the accession of 
King Juan Carlos, Spain opened new contacts with the 
outside world, adopted a democratic constitution, and 
joined the EC. This liberalization carried over into 
television. Most of the country received only two tele­
vision channels, each operated by Radiotelevision Espanola 
(RTVE), Spain's state-owned broadcasting corporation.
Three stations were operated by the regional governments 
Galicia, the Basque country, and Catalonia. Advertising 
was permitted on all stations.62 A new media law, approved 
by Spain's Council of Ministers on April 3, 1987, allowed 
the development of private television in Spain. The new 
law prohibited any person or organization from owning more 
than 25 percent of a network.63
6 Chapman, New Media, p. 22. Gray, Cable TV, p. 70.
62"Marina Specht, "Lady of Spain," Electronic 
Media, April 20, 1987, pp. G3, G17.
63 Peter Besas, "Private TV in Spain Gets 'Okay'," 
Variety, April 15, 1987, p. 1.
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Spain was not active in developing cable television 
or utilizing satellite communications. However, RTVE 
director Pilar Miro pledged to increase Spanish programming 
production and to foster new initiatives to upgrade tele­
vision quality and standards. She was committed to Spanish 
program production, concentrating on programs "that pre­
serve our national cultural identity and our European 
heritage."64 Spain’s entry into the EC set in motion a new 
openness and freedom for television. Efforts made since 
this entry demonstrated its willingness to change and adapt 
to the new era of satellite communications.
Sweden
The Sveriges Radio AB (Swedish Broadcasting 
Corporation) controlled two television stations, SVT-1 and 
SVT-2. Both were financed by subscription license fees.63 
With half of Swedish dwelling units formed into blocks of 
flats, master antennae television systems (MATV) owned by 
local authorities or housing associations became 
significant market factors. These MATV operators developed 
significant power in the Swedish television industry 
because of the number of people subscribing to them.66
64Specht, "Lady," p. 63.
63 Foreign Broadcast Chart, Variety, April 15, 1987,
p. 150.
66 Simon Baker and Vanessa O'Connor, "Sweden Sets 
Pace," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1986, p. 15.
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The tradition of MATV influence was a factor in 
several television-related activities in Sweden. More 
satellite receive dishes for hone use (HTVRO, or television 
receive only for home reception) were available in Sweden 
than any other European nation. The Swedish government had 
one of the least restrictive policies in Europe for dish 
ownership, which was a leading factor in HTVRO growth. 
Televerket, Sweden’s PTT, also sought to encourage the 
development cf cable television. This development put 
Televerket in direct competition with MATV operators for 
television distribution to consumers.67
Sweden was a leader in the development of a direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) project for Scandinavia, called 
Tele-X. Scheduled for launch in 1988. this satellite was 
owned by the governments of Sweden, Norway, and Finland, 
with Sweden's share being a dominant 82 percent. Sweden's 
development and backing of Tele-X was indicative of 
Sweden's commitment to the development of satellite 
television, but its participation was primarily to serve 
the Scandinavian community rather than the rest of 
Europe.6 8
Considerable uncertainty surrounded Sweden’s 
direction in broadcast television. In the 1980s, Sweden 
considered adding another television station and approving
67 Ibid.
68 Taylor, "Battle," pp. 32-33.
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advertising on all Swedish stations. Sweden's strong 
Socialist parties opposed this kind of commercialism, while 
conservatives encouraged it. In September 1987, the 
Socialist party once again voted to continue the ban on 
advertising.6 9
Switzerland
Although politically non-aligned and not part of 
the EC, Switzerland was a vital part of western Europe's 
television marketplace. The private Swiss Broadcasting 
Corporation (SBC) was licensed by the government to direct 
television and other broadcasting activities. The SBC 
operated three services, one for each major language group 
(German, French, and Italian). The Swiss PTT handled 
program transmission and the collection of license fees 
which financed the programming.70
Switzerland’s geographical location played a role 
in shaping its approach to television. Swiss received 
television programs from neighboring France, Germany, and 
Italy. It began developing cable television in the early 
1960s primarily to improve television reception in 
mountainous area. Due to aggressive development of cable 
television, more than half of the Swiss households were 
connected to MATV systems. Cable systems were licensed by
69 Jack Burton, "Swedes Rejecting TV Ads," 
Advertising Age, October 5, 1987, p. 28.
70Gray, Cable Television, p. 135.
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the PTT, which determined which satellite networks were 
made available.71
A referendum was held in December 1984 concerning 
television policy, and as a result, the government began to 
consider proposals to create new stations and introduce 
advertising on television. While the Swiss people in 
general expressed their desire for these changes, some 
leaders voiced concerns on the impact of new television 
services (including satellite networks from other 
countries) on Swiss traditional values and way of life.72
The United Kingdom
Television in the U.K. operated under governmental 
directives that dated back to 1926, when the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was established by the Home 
Secretary. The BBC operated two networks (BBC1 and BBC2) 
and was supported by a tax on television sets in the U.K.
No advertising was allowed. In 1954, the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) was established. It operated 
two networks: ITV and Channel Four. IBA programs were
produced by member stations located throughout the U.K.
Its networks were advertiser supported.73
71 Ibid.
72"More Swiss Channels," Cable and Satellite 
Europe, April 1986, p. 27.
73 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 79- 
81. Gray, Cable TV, pp. 138-39.
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The BBC was under the direction of a board of 
governors, whose members, chairman, and deputy chairman 
were appointed by the Home Secretary. It was required to 
provide television programs "as a public service for 
disseminating information, education, and entertainment."74 
This stable system and the high quality of programming 
produced made British television much admired throughout 
Europe and the world. The consistent ability of the BBC 
and IBA to provide entertainment and information programs 
with variety and high standards was a key reason cable 
television and DBS ventures did not attract significant 
momentum in the U.K. Several British pay television 
services went bankrupt due to lack of subscribers and 
viewers, and high costs. Cable television companies also 
experienced financial difficulties.73
However, the U.K. became the headquarters for 
several of the most influential television networks of the 
early satellite television era, including Sky Channel and 
the SuperChannel. The success of these ventures, coupled 
with widespread availability of American programs in 
Europe, caused concern in other European nations. Some 
felt that pan-European satellite programming would become a 
vehicle for English language dominance and that European 
unity would mean establishment of English as the language
74 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 79.
7 3 Gray, Cable TV. p. 139.
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The public in general seemed satisfied with the 
quality of British television, but operational costs of 
these services continued to increase. The Thatcher 
government commissioned a special committee under the 
direction of Professor Alan Peacock to study the future of 
television in the U.K., particularly the BBC. The Peacock 
Commission released its report in July 1986. It called for 
gradual changes in the financing of the BBC. In the first 
phase, a system like that in existence would continue. But 
in an effort to keep costs in line, budgets and expenses 
would be indexed to inflation. Funding would continue to 
be based on the license fees fixed for each television set. 
The second phase was to follow toward the end of the 
century. In this phase the BBC would become a subscription 
service. Its television signal would be encoded and 
viewers would need to pay for proper equipment to receive 
its programs. The Commission recommended all television 
sets sold or rented in the U.K. after 1988 be equipped for 
encryption and that all restrictions for the reception of 
pay services and programming from other EC nations and be 
removed. The Commission report became the focal point for 
the debate on the future of television in the U.K.77
76 Brenda Maddox, "Sky King," Channels, 
January/February 1986, pp. 53-55.
77Glyndwr Matthias, "For the Birds?," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, August 1986, pp. 36-37.
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Because of its tradition of high standards in 
program production and service, and because of the 
encouragement of its government, the U.K. became a leader 
in the development of European television. The most 
successful pan-European television services were English- 
language services based there, and many of the foremost 
leaders in pan-European television were from the U.K. The 
government had not encouraged public spending in these 
developments but had focused on the role of the private 
sector. Its actions in encouraging private ventures seemed 
to guarantee a leadership role for the English language in 
the development of European television.
Summary
This survey of television policies in eighteen 
nations of western Europe recounts the individuality of 
their approaches to television from the time of the 
inauguration of television service in the 1940s and 1950s 
through 1987. Television was a state monopoly in France, 
Spain, Belgium, and Denmark. The private sector was given 
control in Ireland and Luxembourg, while in Italy, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland, government and private 
sectors shared control. West Germany television operations 
were financed and controlled by the Lander, while the U.K. 
provided for separate public and private commercial 
operations that existed side-by-side. Some nations allowed 
private television, while others prohibited it. Some
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allowed advertising, but others banned it. Yet in spite 
of these diverse approaches, strong controls exercised by 
national governments remained the constant throughout the 
European television industry. However, these policies 
started changing in the 1980s, corresponding with the 
introduction of satellite television.
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CHAPTER IV 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND TELEVISION IN EUROPE
Europeans emerged from World War II willing to 
consider new approaches to their problems. Several 
cooperative organizations were formed in the hope that 
nations could band together. The United States encouraged 
this effort through the Marshall Plan which in 1947 
established the European Recovery Program (ERP) providing 
distribution of more than $12 billion in food, clothing, 
economic aid, and other resources. In 1948, the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation was 
established to distribute these funds. The OEEC provided a 
forum for the nations of western Europe to meet together to 
discuss economic issues and work together to develop 
solutions for their problems. In the years that followed 
other IGOs, such as the Council of Europe and the EC, were 
formed to provide other forums for cooperation among these 
nations.
According to Deutsch’s definition, integration was 
the process of creating "unifying habits and institu­
tions."1 In post World War II Europe, through the
1Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
67
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creation of such organizations, Europeans cane to work 
together. Their labors nay not always have been 
harnonious, but nore unified habits and institutions were 
produced through the fornation and operation of these 
organizations. At the tine of the foundation of such 
organizations as the EC and the Council of Europe, 
television was a developing technology and was not a 
central issue. However, the growing inpact of television 
in the comnunities of Europe and the introduction of new 
technologies such as satellite comnunications and cable 
television during the intervening years forced these older 
organizations to apply their energies to developing 
policies on television. These IGOs were representative of 
the second stage of Etzioni's model of integration, 
demonstrating the way that elite groups were formed to 
coordinate the activities in the appropriate unit sector, 
in this case, television. This chapter will examine major 
IGOs which impacted the development of television or which 
were concerned with television-related technologies. In 
addition, other IGOs were established which addressed the 
development of television and provided oversight to various 
aspects of television activities in Europe.
Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe was established on May 4, 
1949. It grew from an initial membership of ten nations to 
twenty-one by 1987. Its purpose was to achieve greater
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unity among member-nations, determine ways for its members 
to work together to improve the economic and social life of 
the people in member-nations, and uphold the principles of 
democracy. The Council’s executive functions were the 
responsibility of a Committee of Ministers, made up of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each country. Other 
Council organizations included a Parliamentary Assembly 
(which met once a year), a Secretariat, a Commission of 
Human Rights, a Court of Human Rights, a Committee on the 
Mass Media, and other committees. Decisions by the 
Committee of Ministers and the Court of Human Rights were 
binding on all member-nations. Because of this authority 
and the gravity of the subjects it tackled, Committee and 
Court judgments were made with caution. The Committee also 
made non-binding recommendations.2
In 1984 the Council made several pronouncements 
regarding television. The first concerned advertising. 
While agreeing that advertising should comply with laws of 
the country transmitting the advertising, the Council 
recommended that consideration should be given to the laws 
in countries of reception as well. This concern was to be 
particularly evident in countries where a significant 
proportion of a station or network's programs were seen.3
2Europa Yearbook 1985. "Council of Europe," pp.
131-133.
3 Elaine Couprie, "Transfrontier Television by 
Satellite," Media Bulletin. March 1985, p. 11.
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In a second announcement, the Committee of 
Ministers issued three principles: (1) Satellite
television services had to comply with the laws in the 
country transmitting the service. (2) Program producers had 
to abide by the European Convention on Human Rights, 
guaranteeing that diverse opinions would be provided and 
that audience privacy and moral concerns would be 
respected. (3) The right of reply or other appropriate 
actions had to be guaranteed when television programs 
crossed borders.4
In December 1986, the Council held its first 
minister-level conference exclusively dedicated to the mass 
media in Europe. As a result of this conference, the 
Council agreed to begin work on a legally binding 
convention for television and other media.3 It also 
decided that quotas mandating minimum levels of European 
produced programs on European services would not be 
recommended. This action directly opposed the EC 
Commission which proposed quotas in order to stimulate and 
guarantee European television program production. The 
Council acknowledged the importance of production to the 
culture, industries, and economies of Europe, but concluded 
that quotas inadequately addressed this problem.6
4 Ibid.
3 Jack Kindred, "Pan-European Satellite TV 
Regulations in the Works," Variety, December 17, 1986, p. 42.
6 Cable and Satellite Europe, January 1987, p. 5.
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Early in 1987, the Council proposed a regulation 
prohibiting the transmission of advertising originating 
from one country but aimed at an audience in another 
country without the permission of the government of the 
country of reception. This reflected the attempt of the 
Council to resolve the issue of television conflicts.7
The Council's importance to the television debate 
was acknowledged by other European IGOs. For example, the 
EC's Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information, 
and Sport acknowledged that the EC was merely "part of the 
free and democratic Europe associated within the Council of 
Europe." In this context, EC actions were not taken in 
isolation but brought the Community "in line with the 
rulings of the European Court of Human Rights." However, 
the committee expressed concern that the Council was not 
adequately addressing the problems with the situation in 
Europe. It also criticized the Council for its perceived 
aim to "preserve and protect existing national markets as 
far as possible" rather than create a common market 
throughout Europe, which the committee believed should be 
its goal. In contrast, the EC was committed to encourage 
an integrated market, not simply to break down 
broadcasting barriers.8
7 "Council of Europe May Challenge Scan-Sat," Cable 
and Satellite Europe, June 1987, p. 6.
8 European Parliament, Document WG(2) 1738E, 
Brussels, 1985, pp. 31-33.
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The stature and authority of the Council of Europe 
assured that its actions would influence the development of 
television in Europe. Actions it took during the 1980s to 
address cross-border transmission and advertising were 
indicative of its recognition of the need for resolution of 
conflicts between European nations on the subject of 
television.
European Broadcasting Union
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was founded 
in 1950 as an umbrella organization for broadcasting 
organizations in Europe. Its active and associate members 
included more than 100 organizations. Active membership 
was limited to those directly involved in European 
broadcasting while associate membership was open to 
organizations elsewhere in the world. The EBU assisted in 
the development of all forms of broadcasting and supported 
member interests. Its committees studied technical, 
administrative, and legal problems for member 
organizations.9 Its most visible contribution to European 
television was its Eurovision service. Conceived in 1954, 
Eurovision was a television service provided to member 
nations which included sporting and cultural events, and 
news.10 Having launched this part-time service, the EBU
9Anne-Michele Eckstein, ed., Television and New 
Technology (Brussels: European News Agency, 1986), pp. I. 
1-2
10Europa Yearbook 1985, p. 244.
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had hoped to establish a television station that could 
serve all Europe full-time. Such a service would require 
the cooperation of its members and provide television 
programs that could be seen every day throughout Europe.
It tested this concept in 1982 with a service called 
"Eurikon." This test was backed by many of Europe's 
largest broadcasting organizations. The EBU felt 
sufficiently satisfied with the test to develop the concept 
further. This project became known as "Europa" and began 
daily transmission in 1985. The EBU had received a 
commitment from the European Space Agency (ESA) for a free 
transponder on a satellite it was to launch in the late 
1980s.11 However, lack of political and economic support, 
inadequate distribution, and greater than expected costs 
led to the cancellation of Europa in 1986, before its new 
satellite could be launched. The EBU and other 
organizations hoped to revive the project with 
participation from more nations and with reception in more 
European countries.12
To the EBU, television as well as all broadcasting 
activity were part of the cultural and social life of every 
nation. Decisions regarding broadcasting were not to be 
based on financial considerations or to be viewed from any
11 Simon Baker, "A Go-Ahead at Last," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, January 1985, pp. 20-21.
12"Losses," Multichannel News, p. 23
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perspective that would threaten national sovereignty. An 
approach based on economics alone might undermine national 
organizations, and change the nature of broadcasting in 
Europe, which should not be encouraged. The EBU agreed 
with a German Federal Constitutional Court's opinion that 
broadcasting organizations performed a 'public function,’ 
not merely an economic one. Because of this perspective, 
the EBU refused to approach television from the common 
market perspective as favored by the EC. The EBU viewed 
efforts by the EC and others to develop a European media 
policy as threats to national broadcasting laws and to the 
health of television in Europe. In the view of the EBU, 
international television policies already were recognized 
and in place through the World Administrative Radio 
Conference (WARC)— a group within the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITC). Any actions by the EC, the 
EBU believed, would subvert the international broadcasting 
system which was already in place and functioning, and 
which provided all the regulations that were necessary.13
The EBU recommended that no further activity in 
developing a European television policy be undertaken 
within the EC. It also recommended that the new media 
associated with satellite communications be allowed to 
develop before attempts to form media policies be made.
With satellite technology still in the developmental stage,
13 Parliament, Document WG(2) 1738E, pp. 25-26.
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the EBU stressed the need to let the technology progress 
with as few restrictions as possible. Increased regula­
tions at this stage might limit its evolution. From its 
point of view, actions by the EBU itself and the Council of 
Europe were sufficient to protect broadcasting organiza­
tions. Nothing should be done to undermine either these 
organizations or the control of television at the national 
level.14 EBU's president would not even comment on the 
1985 EC Conunission Green Paper on the Media. He believed 
media policy vas strictly a national consideration and 
deferred comment to EBU member governments.
The EBU acknowledged a fragmentation within the 
European television community, and agreed on the urgency 
for unified technical standards to eliminate waste and 
inefficiency caused by the nations of Europe adopting their 
own standards and systems. In its view, the EBU had been 
working for years to end this fragmentation. It believed 
it already had much of the framework and mandate to rectify 
problems in European television. It urged support for its 
efforts and systems, which were based on nearly 40 years of 
involvement in European television, rather than creating 
new organizations or stimulating new efforts within other 
organizations such as the EC.15
14 Ibid.
13 George Waters, speech to the Conference on the
Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15, 1986.
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The actions and policies of the EBU demonstrated 
the importance of television to Europe and the degree to 
which differences existed regarding the direction European 
television should take. As the voice of Europe’s national 
broadcasting organizations, the EBU championed national 
sovereignty and stressed that television questions should 
remain within the jurisdiction of national governments and 
international broadcasting organizations already in exist­
ence. While striving for harmonization and close communi­
cations in programming and technical standards, the EBU 
championed national rights and sovereignty within a 
cooperative European environment.
European Space Agency
The first pan-European space organization, the 
European Space Research Organization (ESRO), was formed in 
1972 to pool Europe's resources in order more efficiently 
to develop an effective space program for participating 
nations. Within months, several nations joined to form 
the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), to 
develop Europe’s rocket launcher capability. In 1975 ESRO 
and ELDO were merged into the European Space Agency (ESA). 
France was the dominant member in ESA with 63.87 percent 
ownership. The remaining percentage was divided among nine 
other nations, the largest of which was West Germany.16
16 Allan Ward, "Science Reaches Orbit," Space, pp.
3-4.
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ESA was the only European organization capable of 
launching satellites, the instrument by which satellite 
television was relayed throughout the continent. It 
provided a forum for planning, national government 
interaction, and staying on the cutting edge of satellite 
technology. ESA also cooperated with other major IGOs in 
Europe's utilization of space technology for television.
Intelsat
The International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (INTELSAT) was founded on August 20, 1964, to 
establish the world's first global satellite communications 
network. By 1987, Intelsat had 112 member-nations, 
including all the major nations of Europe. Intelsat 
maintained a system of orbiting satellites as well as 
support ground stations for signal reception and 
distribution.17 Intelsat took on additional importance for 
Europe because several satellite television services used 
Intelsat satellites for distribution of their programming. 
This usage was important in the development of satellite 
television in Europe. Intelsat promised to continue to be 
important for Europe, primarily as a distribution system.
Eutelsat
European nations agreed that Intelsat played a 
valuable role in international satellite development.
17 Lang, Almanac, pp. 57-59.
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However, they concluded that Europe needed to develop its 
own satellite distribution system. Therefore, in 1977, the 
European Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(EUTELSAT) was established. Membership included 25 nations 
by 1987, and was open to any country that was a member of 
the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations (CEPT), the organization from which 
Eutelsat received its most significant impetus. Responsi­
bility for membership in Eutelsat was with each member- 
nation's PTT, the governmental department responsible for 
post, telegraph, telephone, and other related services.18
Originally, Eutelsat was created to supply 
telephone, high-speed data transmissions, and Eurovision 
transmissions from the EBU. Prior to the launch of its 
first satellite, Eutelsat FI, a television service, later 
renamed "Sky Channel," started transmitting on an Intelsat 
satellite. Cable systems throughout Europe started 
carrying its programming. Sky Channel's transmissions 
moved to one of the U.K.'s transponders on FI after its 
launch. The impact of Sky Channel changed the nature of 
Eutelsat's service, and within one year of its launch FI 
was used almost exclusively for program distribution from 
satellite television services.19 Eutelsat maintained a 
monopoly on telecommunications links (including television
18 Ibid., pp. 117-19.
19 Ibid.
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signals) relayed between countries of Europe. Eutelsat 
developed the technical systems for use in Europe, but 
member PTTs or their designated representatives decided how 
to use the systems provided. Eutelsat satellites were 
built and launched by the ESA. Once functional, satellites 
became Eutelsat responsibility. Because demand for 
satellites was great and available space initially was 
limited, a system had to be devised to award access to 
satellites fairly. Eutelsat determined that satellite use 
would be allocated based on the size of contributions to 
Eutelsat, with the larger nations getting the most 
desirable allocations. However, its director and governing 
board attempted to make these allocations as fair and 
equitable as possible, providing space for nations of all 
sizes.20
Eutelsat and its director general, Andrea Caruso, 
were vocal about the direction being taken for European 
satellite systems. Eutelsat strongly opposed the Coronet 
and Astra projects developed by SES in Luxembourg. Caruso 
argued that the EC ratified the Eutelsat agreement which 
gave it exclusive power to operate satellites in Europe. 
Eutelsat opposed these projects for legal as well as 
practical reasons. Development of projects like Astra 
weakened the Eutelsat system, impairing all of its members
20 Conversation with Kr. Folkestad, Norwegian 
Telecommunications Administration, and Hans Bratterud, New 
World Channel, Oslo, March 8, 1985.
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by making the systems less efficient. Caruso expressed 
astonishment that the Luxembourg government could both 
belong to Eutelsat and encourage the SES projects. He 
found it "inconceivable that a government with a strong 
commitment to Europeanism, such as Luxembourg's , could 
support such a venture."21 Eutelsat believed its monopoly 
power was needed for Europe to develop successfully its 
satellite capability. Caruso warned of the disastrous 
consequences if there were no controls over satellite 
development and utilization in Europe. "If deregulation 
takes place in European satellite telecommunications, 
there will only be losers," he warned. "There is not 
enough demand for TV distribution and telecommunications 
service here to support two competitive systems." As the 
voice of the PTTs, Eutelsat supported the monopoly power 
enjoyed by all PTTs, as well as by Eutelsat itself.
Caruso predicted economic and social disorder if private 
operators competed with government organizations.22 
Eutelsat and SES resolved their differences in September 
1987, when a compromise was announced by which Eutelsat 
agreed to end its opposition to SES.23
21Glyndwr Matthias, "The Monopoly Strikes Back," 
Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1987, p. 40.
22 Simon Baker, "Eutelsat Closes Rank," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, August 1984, pp. 10-11.
23"Eutelsat and Astra Coordinate," Cable and 
Satellite Express, October 2, 1987, p. 1.
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Eutelsat promised to take an active role in shaping 
European developments in satellite television. It was the 
forum for decision-makers in Europe to determine the type 
of satellite systems and hence the delivery systems for 
television of the future.
European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)
CEPT was established in 1959 to strengthen rela­
tions between postal and telecommunications administra­
tions in Europe. Efforts to provide a more advanced 
distribution system for its responsibilities encouraged 
CEPT to establish Eutelsat. In 1987, 26 nations were part 
of CEPT. Its responsibilities included harmonizing the 
administrative and technical aspects of the European 
P T T s.24
Various Associations 
Although not IGOs, associations have acted together 
to bring groups within European nations to help direct 
activities in the development of television. While not 
having the same influence and power as IGOs, many of these 
organizations had considerable influence because of the 
stature of their collective memberships. Key associations 
included the European Federation for Audiovisual 
Filmmakers, the European Cinematographic Office, European
24 Eckstein, Television, p. I 1.
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Bureau of Consumer Unions, and European Association of 
Advertising Agencies.
Summary
The involvement of these IGOs in the development 
and oversight of various aspects of television resulted in 
increased interaction among various European nations at 
many levels. The IGO with the most visibility in Europe 
was the EC. The following chapter is dedicated to its role 
in the evolution of television in Europe.
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CHAPTER V 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
AND THE INTEGRATED TELEVISION MARKET
The EC developed out of Jean Monnet’s lobbying for 
a sharing of resources in Europe, specifically the raw 
materials that had been a subject of disputes between 
Germany and France.1 This cause was taken up by French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and on May 9, 1950,
Schuman unveiled a plan that was to bear his name. The 
Schuman Plan called for the pooling of the production of 
all coal and steel in France and Germany, as well as other 
countries wanting to participate.2 The proposal was 
embraced by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as well 
as by the Benelux countries. On May 4, 1951, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Italy signed the treaty in Paris that 
created the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS). The 
dialogue among these nations continued and in 1952 they 
created the European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC, 
although later rejected by the French Parliament and never
bonnet. Memoirs, p. 291-293.
2 Harold Cullender, "France Proposes a Coal-Steel 
Pool with German Unit," New York Times, May 10, 1950, p. 1.
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put into effect, would have created a combined European 
military force- On March 25, 1957, the six nations adopted 
the Treaties of Rome, which brought into existence the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the EC.
These treaties went into effect on January 1, 1958. Joint 
administrative supervision was developed for the three 
treaty organizations, and their activities were generally 
referred to in terms of the EC. The EC sought to establish 
a genuine common market among the member-nations, stimulate 
growth and harmonization of member economic policies, and 
improve the standard of living for their peoples. Customs 
duties between members and other restrictions limiting the 
flow of goods across borders were to be eliminated. A 
system was to be established to abolish distorted practices 
in competition. Perhaps most importantly, the EC was given 
legal authority to establish a common market among 
signatory nations. Membership in the Community increased 
to nine in 1973 with the addition of Denmark, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom, to ten in 1981 with the addition of 
Greece, and to twelve in 1986 when Spain and Portugal 
joined.3 In 1987, Turkey applied for admission.
General direction of the EC was provided by the 
European Council, an organization technically not part of 
the Treaties of Rome. Since it included the heads of state 
and government for member-nations, this Council, so-named
3Europa Yearbook 1985, p. 138.
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in 1975 by then French President Giscard d'Estaing, met 
regularly to set the course and approve major policy for 
the Community. By treaty the highest ranking division of 
the EC was the Council of Ministers, represented in most 
cases by each nation's foreign minister. The EC Commission 
was responsible for the administration of the Community. 
Member-nations appointed one member to the Commission, with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the 
U.K. having an additional member to reflect their large 
populations. Once appointed, commissioners were not to 
consult with their governments about Community matters.4 
The only part of the EC government directly elected by the 
people of Europe was the European Parliament (EP), 
although originally its members were selected by the 
national governments. Initially conceived as a consultant 
and watchdog body, the powers and responsibilities of the 
EP increased during the 1980s to include expanded budget 
obligations. The work of the 434-member EP was often 
accomplished in committees and subcommittees which studied 
and made recommendations on specific subjects.3 Legal 
affairs within the Community were the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice, made up of thirteen judges who 
were appointed, at the consent of the national governments,
4 Ibid., p. 141.
3 The European Parliament (Information Service, 
European Parliament: Luxembourg, 1985), p. 14.
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for terms of six years. Appeals could be brought to the 
Court by member-states, the Council, the Commission, or any 
person or company affected by a decision of any part of the 
EC. All Court decisions were binding and final, and could 
not be appealed in national courts.6
The Treaties of Rome and Paris established a 
community intended "to lay the foundation of an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe." The EC was charged 
with working to "eliminate the barriers which divide 
Europe," and the national governments pledged themselves to 
achieve this goal through their signatures on the Treaties 
and through their personal and official commitments to 
European unity.7 However, television was evolving 
throughout Europe as an industry and a broadcasting medium 
along strictly national lines. Chapter Three of this 
thesis detailed the depth to which television policies and 
practices were indigenous to each nation-state. Exacting 
regulations in matters such as advertising content and 
programming philosophy had the force of limiting 
interaction across borders. Technical standards were 
typical of the nationalistic approaches in evidence. As 
color television was being developed, each nation
5 Commission of the European Communities, The Court 
of Justice (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, 1984), p. 27.
7 European Community Information Service, "Europe 
Without Frontiers by 1992," European Community News, August 
2, 1985, p. 5.
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determined its own standards for transmission and reception 
of television signals. Even though the EC, the EBU, and 
other IGOs were in existence throughout this period, 
countries in Europe did not agree upon a single standard 
for television. Most nations adapted the "phase 
alteration by line," or PAL system; but France and Greece 
opted for the "Sequence Couleur k M6moire," or SECAM 
system.8 This led to two separate, parallel technical 
systems and divided the European market with resulting 
increases in production, distribution, and marketing costs. 
Fragmentation and inefficiencies multiplied in research and 
development, equipment, quality, and other aspects. The 
lack of unity in Europe had many repercussions. An 
increasing volume of television equipment sold in Europe 
came from Japan and the U.S. Many television programs were 
produced in the U.S. Europe's lack of harmony and unity 
produced the very fragmentation of efforts and 
counterproductivity the E C ’s founders had sought to avoid.9
During the 1980s, the EC began exerting pressure to 
move the Community closer to a common market. In early 
1985 then Commission President Jacques Delors told the EP 
that Europe had fallen behind "in a world where large 
entities dominate." Europe had manpower and capital 
resources comparable to those of the U.S. and Japan. "What
8 Lang, World Satellite Almanac, p. 17.
9Eckstein, Television, pp. 3, 53.
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we lack," he summarized, "is a genuine common market where 
all economic and scientific operators can engage more 
easily in exchanges and cooperation." Later that year, the 
Commission reported to the European Council that Europe was 
at a "crossroads." The report concluded that "we either go 
ahead— with resolution and determination— or we drop back 
into mediocrity."10
Faced with these choices. Community leaders agreed 
upon a goal: the creation of a truly common market without
frontiers by 1992. By that year barriers were to be 
removed, and the sale and marketing, as well as the flow of 
products and services, were to be possible as easily across 
as within national boundaries. In February 1986 final 
Community approval was given to what was called the "Single 
European Act," which made this goal the official policy of 
the EC and its individual member-nations. Every effort was 
to be made to make Europe into a unified market by 1992.
The Commission approached every aspect of Europe within EC 
jurisdiction to determine how barriers to the common market 
could be eliminated.11 Television was one of the 
industries on which the Commission focused attention. The 
Commission believed that television was critical to the 
development of a unified market, and that it was the duty
1 0 Information Service, "Europe Without Frontiers,"
pp. 1-2.
11"The Institutions of the European Community," 
Europe, May 1987, p. 23.
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and the responsibility of the EC both to have and enforce a 
Community television policy.12
The following sections summarize the actions taken 
by and the perspectives of each branch of the EC pertaining 
to television. This will demonstrate the position each 
developed within the 1980s, and the consensus throughout 
the Community on television policy in Europe.
The European Court of Justice
It was said that the foundation for Community 
action rested in its legal framework within the Treaties of 
Rome and Paris. The Community was established as a legal 
entity with an existence based on law. At the firs* 
gathering of the ECSC Assembly, Jean Monnet remarked that, 
"The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone.
Rules are needed." He said that the only way to prevent 
war was to create institutions and legal systems to sustain 
the Community, and that the Community needed to exist with 
"the sanction of law, under the authority of the Court."13 
The importance of law to the Community was also echoed by 
another of its early leaders, Walter Hallstein, one time 
state secretary in the foreign ministry of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Hallstein wrote that the EC "is a 
creation of law; it is a source of law; and it is a legal
12 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 8-9.
13Monnet, Memoirs, p. 384.
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system." He concluded that Community member-states 
"surrender a part of their separate national sovereignty, 
and . . . create an entirely new and independent legal 
system to which both they as states and their citizens are 
subject.M14
The European Court of Justice was established to 
interpret and confirm Community actions in light of the 
legal parameters of primary and secondary legislation. 
Primary legislation applied to agreements made by the 
member-states themselves which had the force of creating 
binding laws. This consisted of Community treaties and 
agreements among the member-states with relevance to 
Community life. Secondary legislation included law created 
by Community institutions and international agreements 
concluded by the Community as a whole.13 The Court acted 
to interpret primary and secondary legislation and provide 
clear definitions of the nature and laws of the Community.
An example was the landmark 1962 van Gend en Loos case. In 
this case the Court concluded that the Community was a "new 
legal order of international law for the benefits of which 
the States have limited their sovereign rights." The 
sovereignty of the Community applied both to member-states
14 Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making, trans. 
Charles Roetter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 30, 33.
13 Commission of the European Communities, The 
European Community's Legal System, (Luxembourg: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984), 
p. 5.
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as well as to the peoples within those states. Therefore 
Community laws created rights and obligations for Community 
institutions, member-states, and citizens of every member- 
state.16 In the 1964 Costa versus ENEL case, the Court 
ruled that The EC Treaty "created its own legal system 
which . . . became an integral part of the legal system of 
the Member States and which their courts are bound to 
apply." Through this decision, an official relationship 
was established between national courts and the Court of 
Justice, with the Court acting as the final court of 
appeals for all actions of national courts. That same 
year, the Court ruled that "the executive force of 
Community law cannot vary from one State to another in 
deference to subsequent domestic law, without jeopardizing 
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty." Here the 
Court established its primacy over domestic laws within 
member-states in any matter relative to the Community. 
Another type of case heard by the Court was proceedings for 
annulment. These proceedings were attempts to overturn 
action taken by a Community organization. They could be 
brought to the Court by member-states, other Community 
organizations, or by individuals.17
The Court heard several cases that allowed it to 
apply these principles to television in the Community. In
16 Ibid., p. 10.
17 Commission, Court, p. 13.
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1984, Gijs de Vrie;;, an EP member (MP) from the 
Netherlands, argued before the Court that Dutch media laws 
violated the Treaty of Rome which allowed for a free flow 
of information among EC member-nations. He attacked Dutch 
culture minister Eelco Brinkman for "perpetuating 
provincial politics which are not in agreement with the 
spirit of the European Community." In describing what he 
expected from the Court, de Vries said, "There will be very 
little left of the Dutch media policy when the European 
judge has finished with it."18 The Court agreed with de 
Vries and ordered the Dutch government to bring its media 
policies in line with the Treaty.19 De Vries vowed to 
bring every member-state before the Court if he believed it 
violated the Treaties.20 In 1985, de Vries teamed with 
French MP Simone Veil to challenge French media laws in the 
Court of Justice. De Vries and Veil claimed French law 
violated the Treaty of Rome by restricting foreign station 
allocations on cable television systems.21 By 1987 no 
decision on this case had been made.
The Court attempted to maintain a balanced approach 
toward sensitive issues such as broadcasting. It sought to
18"Dutch Government may be Forced to Change Media 
Law," Cable and Satellite Europe, March 1985, p. 61.
19 Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.
20 Cable and Satellite Europe, June 19P5, p. 23.
21 "EEC Attacks French Media Law," Cable and 
Satellite Europe, September 1985, p. 5.
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protect national interests and at the same time bring media 
laws and conditions in member states into line with the 
Treaties. Two of the governing principles of the Court 
were consistency and harmonization. For example, the 1978 
Debauve case involved the Belgian law which acknowledged 
the existence of zones of natural reception of foreign 
broadcasting stations in Belgium. In this case the Court 
ruled that laws "cannot be regarded as a restriction upon 
freedom to provide services so long as those laws treat all 
such services identically whatever their origin." However, 
the Court also confirmed that member-states can "grant 
television organizations the exclusive right to conduct 
radio and television transmissions." It hereby confirmed 
national rights to television monopolies.22
Advertising on television was another volatile 
issue taken before the Court of Justice. The Court 
affirmed each nation’s right to limit and define as it saw 
fit the role of advertising in order to protect the general 
interest of the Community.23
The extent to which member-states obeyed court 
ruling with which they disagreed was a fundamental factor 
in the future of the Community. A Community document noted 
that the member states generally "conform, sooner or later,
22 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp.
150, 160.
23 Ibid., pp. 150-1.
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to the Court's judgment." However, there had been occa­
sions when countries delayed compliance while attempting to 
change Community rules. The document warned that, "If such 
behavior became the norm, it would threaten the very 
foundation of the Community." This same document stated 
that no penalties were available to force member-states to 
comply.2 4
While retaining its concern for the protection of 
national societies, the European Court of Justice actions 
in the case of the Dutch media laws set a precedent by 
ruling that national television policies must conform to 
Community law.25 The Court's actions brought focus to the 
question of sovereignty in the Community, the degree to 
which the Community had sovereignty over television policy 
or any other issue, and the degree to which national 
governments retained it. The Court of Justice performed a 
significant function in interpreting Community law and 
providing a forum for legal decisions for the television 
debate. However, the Community depended on individual 
states to comply with Court judgments.
Television and the European Parliament
Since the EP was comprised of 434 members from 
nations throughout Europe, it provided a forum for the
24 Commission, Court, p. 12.
25 Cable and Satellite Europe, June 1985, p. 23.
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discussion and study of many issues of concern to 
individual MPs- Throughout the early 1980s, several MPs 
began stressing the importance of television to the 
Community and the need for changes in the manner in which 
industry was developing in Europe. Among the first 
activist MPs who favored stronger community action 
regarding television were Gijs de Vries and Wilhelm Hahn.
Dutch MP de Vries lobbied through the press, 
Parliament meetings, committees, before the Court of 
Justice, and in other forums, that a unified television 
policy was critical to the creation of an integrated 
Europe. He believed that the on-going fragmentation of the 
European market perpetuated an atmosphere that was harmful 
to all Europeans. European companies needed cross-border 
advertising and marketing to flourish and were hindered by 
the absence of an integrated community. A united European 
television market would stimulate its economy and benefit 
every sector in Europe.26 De Vries claimed that too often 
Europeans were reactive and were unwilling to work 
together, and that the EC was mired in bureaucracy and slow 
to act. He criticized the EC Commission for being too 
timid in pursuing an integrated market. In 1986 he 
observed that the Commission had been working on a 
copyright policy for five years without completing a final 
draft. De Vries championed eliminating all but a minimum
26"Dutch Government," Cable and Satellite, p. 61.
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of restrictions on television. Some people and organiza­
tions, including the EC Commission, favored quotas of 
minimum levels of European-produced programs for all 
television services in Europe. However, de Vries felt this 
violated common sense as well as national and Community 
commitments within the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).27 He also persistently sought changes in the 
media laws for the Netherlands.28
West German MP Wilhelm Hahn introduced the first 
motion before the EP recommending that a media policy be 
developed for Europe.29 Hahn believed that the media was 
the "great gate in European union," and that the common 
market could "only be attained if we have a common media 
market." In his view, television in Europe had to "go 
through primordial changes and become European television," 
no longer being national in nature. The Treaty of Rome 
gave the EC not just an opportunity but a mandate to 
harmonize the broadcasting activities in the Community. To 
Hahn, this harmonization was not optional.30 In a December
27Gijs de Vries, speeches delivered at the 
Conference on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, 
October 15-16, 1986.
28 Commission of the European Communities, 
Spokesman's Service, Document QXW0653/85EN.
29 European Parliament, Debates of the European 
Parliament, Document No. 2-329/254, September 12, 1985.
30 Wilhelm Hahn, speech delivered at the Conference 
on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 
16, 1986.
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1985 speech in the EP, Hahn remarked that "the introduc­
tion of a European media policy will be an important step 
towards European union." The development of satellite 
television provided the Community with a great opportunity 
to move toward this union. In light of satellite tele­
vision, he believed the Community had two choices: "let
the developments unleashed by the new media pass it by or 
harness them in a common media policy." Satellites would 
mean the "end to the era of nationally and territorially 
limited television zones as they evolved in Europe" in the 
1950s. Television was critical to establishing a common 
market because it would be "dismantling the frontiers and 
obstacles which have existed between the Member-States." 
Hahn claimed that media policy was the "main prerequisite 
for imbuing the people of Europe with the idea of European 
union."31 Urging by Hahn led the EP to support the 
creation of a European-wide common market for radio and 
television.33 Hahn was one of the MPs who believed that if 
Europeans did not take action to regulate the development 
of satellite television, market forces would exert too 
strong an influence on Europe. Hahn warned of American 
cultural imperialism since U.S. firms dominated the 
international television and film production industries.
31 European Parliament, Debates, September 12, 1985.
32 Jack Monnet, "Euro Parliament Votes to Adopt
Common Market Approach to TV," Variety, October 23, 1985, 
p. 34.
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Europe needed to unite or face domination from America.33
Television and Parliamentary Committees 
The EP was divided into eighteen permanent standing 
committees that enabled members to study more thoroughly 
proposed laws and vital issues facing the Community. 
Committees made reports and recommendations for 
consideration by the EP as a whole.34 Because of its 
growing importance for Community life, television policy 
was studied by a number of these committees. The following 
summarizes studies on the impact of television in Europe by 
six of these committees.
Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection 
This committee noted that television was an "area 
of major importance as a result of its considerable and 
ever increasing influence on the process of European 
unification." It strongly supported the development of a 
television policy within the EC (rather than the Council of 
Europe). However, it concluded that laws concerning 
television should be enacted at the national level rather 
than within the EC "so as to ensure flexibility and speed 
of reaction to any complaints." It called for clear
33 Hahn, Brussels speech.
34 The European Parliament (Information Service, 
European Parliament: Luxembourg, p. 1985), p. 14.
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standards of programming and advertising content to protect 
citizens.3 5
Committee on Youth, Culture,
Education, Information and Sport
With Wilhelm Hahn as a committee member, the 
committee called on the Commission and the European Council 
to move toward a comprehensive European media policy. This 
policy was believed to be vital because a European 
television environment was an "essential feature of a 
European community in the process of integration.” There 
had to be freedom within the Community to receive 
television programming from all member states. It 
recommended the creation of a multilingual European 
television service (like Europa), and the harmonization of 
broadcasting laws throughout Europe.36
The committee recognized the importance of 
television to the process of European integration. All 
restrictions on transborder transmissions had to be 
eliminated if the member-states were to develop closer 
ties. It called on member-states "to give priority to the 
trans-frentier broadcasting of European and national 
television channels during the development of cable and 
satellite television to come, in order to prevent the
•'^Parliament, Document WG (2J 1738E, p. 8-9.
3 6 Ibid., p . 7.
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process of European integration from being hampered or 
jeopardized.” The development of a united European tele­
vision market was vital for the protection and development 
of European culture. It concluded that "Europe's arts 
industries require a single domestic market for broad­
casting in order to maintain both their cultural and 
commercial hold internationally.”37
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights
This committee concluded that telecommunications 
was "the most crucial of the challenges" the Community 
faced. Planning had to be started to set up the necessary 
telecommunications infrastructures. Freedom of program 
movement across borders was needed. Legislation within EC 
member-states had to be coordinated to increase 
harmonization of television activities and to allow Europe 
to compete effectively in the manufacturing and production 
of equipment and programs in worldwide television 
industries. The committee concluded that "the freedom of 
radio and television broadcasting is of vital importance 
for the very future of Europe, not only as a cultural but 
also as an economic entity." However, efforts to encourage 
economic development must not infringe upon the freedoms of 
Europe's citizens in any way.38
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., pp. 45-49.
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Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
This committee drew attention to the economic and 
cultural factors necessary for the development of the 
common market in broadcasting. For example, the fragmen­
tation of the market forced Philips, the Dutch industrial 
firm, to produce more than 100 different types of tele­
vision sets to meet Europe's varied technical standards.
The committee believed that only by pooling its resources 
and by developing a common market would Europe have a 
market sufficiently large enough to be able to make the 
financial commitments necessary to produce quality 
programs. Without a more integrated market, this committee 
projected that expanded satellite television programming 
would mean increased dependence on American programs, thus 
eroding the European cultural and economic identity. The 
committee recommended that the Community take action to 
create economic incentives, remove barriers, and create a 
common market, but assure that individual privacy and 
European interests were protected. It warned that inaction 
by the Community would lead to increased fragmentation as 
well as an erosion of European industries and culture. It 
hoped that the Community had learned from its earlier years 
when no European policies were in place. The EC had to act 
aggressively to shape events rather than allowing events in
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the broadcasting industry to develop on their own.39
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy
With Gijs de Vries as an active member, this 
committee predictably championed the end of national 
technical standards for television in favor of European 
standards, as well as aggressive development of European 
initiatives and policies to assure a voice for Europe in 
the future of the international television industry. There 
was a fear that Europe already had waited too long to 
combine its resources and energies. For example, the 
Japanese had already made a united effort to establish 
standards for the development of high definition television 
(HDTV)--a higher quality television technology with better 
quality visual images and sound. European fragmentation 
may have allowed Japan to set the pace and forced Europe to 
play a subservient role in this industry’s future.40 The 
committee blamed much of these problems on the inactivity 
of the EC Commission, which had not been forceful enough in 
promoting the importance of a strong, unified Community 
television policy. Europe needed to band together in every 
way possible to avoid getting further behind.41
39 The European Parliament, Document PE 98.359, pp.
17, 18, 20, 35.
40 European Parliament, Document PE 105.541, pp. 5-10.
41de Vries, Brussels speech.
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Economic and Social Committee
Technically, this organization was not a parlia­
mentary committee but rather a group of 156 representa­
tives of various unions, multinational corporations, and 
other special interests groups in the Community. It was 
used often for consultation by the Commission as well as 
the European Council, but it had the prerogative to develop 
and express opinions on its own initiative as well.42 In 
1975 this committee decided to deliver an opinion on the 
importance of telecommunications in the Community "as a 
catalyst and instigator of economic and social change."
The committee noted that the Community had only begun to 
recognize the importance of this industry and warned that 
EC television standards and policies needed to be har­
monized.43 Ten years later, in July 1985, the committee 
reported that "the creation of a common market for radio 
and television would be of great importance" for the 
European economy. It recognized that "cross-frontier 
television broadcasting acts as an additional spur to the 
creation of efficient integrated communications networks 
which are of vital importance for the international 
competitiveness of European industry in the future." Many 
thousands of people worked in television-related activities
42 The European Parliament, p. 8.
43 The European Parliament, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, December 15, 1975, pp. 23, 24, 27.
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and industries. This committee stressed the economic 
implications for stimulation of television activities, 
including government support for programming ventures in 
order to achieve better European products. Such efforts 
would stimulate more program production and result in less 
need for government support.44
Satellite television represented a new age for the 
cons nit! er with increases in programs, services, and options. 
The committee warned that satellite technology could help 
make the European public a "plaything of those who exercise 
a direct influence on the media." Therefore some measures 
were necessary to protect the public from exploitation.
New elites might develop who could create a new kind of 
discrimination by excluding access to the media from anyone 
they wished to exclude. Adequate controls over programming 
and advertising content had to be maintained to prevent 
favoritism and assure that "broadcasting media do not have 
a harmful effect on citizens in general and on certain 
groups of society in particular." New television policies 
had to be based on the overall good of the Community rather 
than on financial gain or commercialism.45
The committee conceded that satellite television 
programs had the potential for significant cultural change
44 Economic and Social Committee, Revised Draft 
Report on Television Without Frontiers (European Economic 
Community: Brussels, 1985), pp. 8-9.
45 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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and impact. It cited studies which had demonstrated that 
children watched more foreign-language programs from other 
countries than adults, indicating that the introduction of 
satellite television would produce meaningful modifications 
in the lifestyles of future generations. Countries like 
Belgium and Ireland had already experienced significant 
cultural impact from programs received from other 
countries. The committee cautioned that these concerns 
should not be taken lightly and that the Community must 
take steps to make sure that national cultures are not 
destroyed or negatively impacted because of satellite 
television. It also warned of the negative consequences if 
Europe followed the patterns established in the United 
States, opened up the television market, and adopted less 
restrictive programming and quality standards. Europe had 
to avoid any development that focused on the profit motive 
"by pandering to the wishes of the masses and producing and 
sending out nothing but light-entertainment programmes." 
This kind of programming might attract large audiences, 
increase revenues, and even stimulate European integration. 
However, television would lose "its importance as a vehicle 
for the dissemination of objective information accessible 
to everyone, as an instrument of continuing education, and 
as a link between all currents of society." In this sense, 
television needed to be approached from a "cultural and 
social point of view."46
4 6 Ibid., pp. 17, 18, 23, 24.
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Summary of Parliamentary Actions 
Numerous parliamentary committees, MPs, and 
Parliament as a whole concluded that Europe had to develop 
a Community-wide television policy. Some policy recommen­
dations differed among these parts of the EC, but there was 
general consensus that Europe would never achieve total 
integration as long as national governments retained 
control over the media. Much of Parliament’s focus was on 
the EC Commission and its initiatives in the Community. 
Actions taken by the Commission are explored in the 
following section.
The EC Commission and Television 
The EC Commission, consisting of 17 members as of 
1987, was responsible to ensure that Community rules and 
guidelines were observed and respected. It proposed 
actions and policies to the Council of Ministers, imple­
mented EC policies, and managed most of the Community 
budget. The Commission approached subjects such as 
television from many perspectives. It had to protect the 
human rights of Community citizens as well as uphold the 
Treaties and develop a common market. It was concerned 
with the impact decisions and policies had on relations 
with non-Community nations and on competition and internal 
relations in the Community. Only after years of study did 
the Commission submit its recommendations on television in 
Europe. Issued in June 1984, the report was called,
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"Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the
Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, 
Especially by Satellite and Cable." This Green Paper 
became a focus of the television debate in Europe. The 
paper was written in response to Parliament's resolution on 
radio and television broadcasting in the EC of March 12, 
1982, in which the EP recommended that rules be drawn up 
for European radio and television broadcasting. It 
acknowledged the importance of other recommendations and 
studies within the Community as critical in stimulating its 
investigation. It particularly cited a 1982 report by the 
Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information, and 
Sport. This report concluded that the mass media was 
"controlled at the national level" and that the EC had to 
act at the Community level to increase European identity 
through a new Community media policy. The Commission 
recognized the fear expressed by the EC's Political Affairs 
Committee that chaos might result if the Community took 
either no action or too restrictive an approach. Article 
10 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms guaranteed freedom of expression in 
Europe, including freedom "to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers." The Political 
Affairs Committee cautioned that "this open information 
market must not mean that satellite broadcasts should be
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allowed to flood the Community." At the same time it must 
not create such freedom from controls that access to the 
media would be decided based on financial resources. The 
Commission was urged to "draw up a directive ensuring that 
commercial interests are channeled into a direction 
acceptable to the Community and made subject to certain 
conditions."«7
The Commission set forth a broad judgment at the 
outset of the paper: the EC had sovereignty over tele­
vision in the Community. It cited several articles within 
the Treaties as its justification for this assertion. 
Article 60 gave the EC authority over broadcast signals 
transmitted or relayed by radio waves within the 
Community. Article 59 provided for the abolition of 
restrictions on the freedom to broadcast within the 
Community. Article 62 guaranteed "broadcasters the right 
to transmit or relay their signal to other Member States." 
Articles 9, 12, 30, and 31 guaranteed "broadcaster 
organizations, as well as their suppliers and customers 
both at home and abroad, the freedom to take part in 
community-wide trade." Therefore the Treaties gave the 
Community jurisdiction over television policies and over 
other broadcasting activities in member-states.48
47 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, pp. 2- 
3. "Institutions,” Europe, pp. 23-24.
4«Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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However, the Commission acknowledged that other 
issues relating to television needed to be considered. 
Technical, practical, cultural, economic, and social 
barriers had to be overcome to achieve a unified European 
television policy. The power of each nation to maintain 
some measure of control was never questioned; but standard­
ization of technical, legal, and regulatory issues, and 
increased harmonization of policies, program standards, and 
production throughout Europe was necessary.49
Once the Green Paper was issued, the Commission 
became more active in making other recommendations on 
European television. In April 1985, it recommended that 
the Community establish a system for aiding television 
program and film production in Europe. It was feared that 
without this stimulus, the European production industry 
would not be able to compete with the American production 
industry. The Commission proposed that the process of 
seeking aid be channeled to stimulate joint ventures 
between private and public companies in member-states. Aid 
would be available only to cooperative productions 
involving partners from at least three different member- 
states. It was hoped this process would stimulate 
integration.50 This proposal focused attention on the
4 9 Ibid., pp. 1-9.
30 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal 
for a Council Regulation, Document 85/C 125/09, April 23, 
1935, p. 3.
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Commission's belief that only a European approach to 
television made sense. It believed that eventually Europe 
would be so unified that it would have the economic and 
legal integration to sustain production at the scale 
necessary to fill market demand. All actions concerning 
television "must be conceived in international terms since 
the use of satellites will make frontiers meaningless."31
Another expression of its concern for television 
was the "M.E.D.I.A." program (for "Mesures pour Encourager 
le Developpement de 1'Industrie de production 
Audiovisuelle," or measure for the development of the 
audiovisual production industry). This policy recommended 
three measures: (1) broadcast standard uniformity; (2)
audiovisual market flexibility based on recommendations in 
the Green Paper; and (3) support and stimulation for 
production development. This policy urged that all 
Community branches and member-states work together to 
increase the unification and prosperity of the people of 
Europe as well as their united influence throughout the 
world. M.E.D.I.A. encouraged the simultaneous production 
of programs in many languages in order "to overcome the 
language barrier which stands in the way of trading 
cultural products." It also supported development of less 
expensive subtitling and dubbing procedures, cooperative
3 1 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal 
for a Council Regulation, Document COM (85) 174 final, June
io, 1985, p. 1.
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projects like Europa, and financial backing of multilingual 
projects.32 In March 1986, the Commission recommended that 
the Community and all member-states adopt a new technical 
standard for television transmission, the "MAC family 
standards." This policy was recommended after years of 
study involving the EBU, leading industrial organizations, 
and national governments. It set the course for increased 
technical harmonization within the Community.33
While the Commission as a whole believed television 
was important for integration, individual commissioners 
expressed their own personal concern for television’s role 
in Europe. Lord Cockfield actively championed the unifi­
cation of television policy within the EC and believed 
television would play a decisive role in determining the 
future nature of European integration. In September 1985, 
he said that television "can exercise a powerful influence 
in bringing together the peoples of Europe into a single 
integrated Community." He warned that it was impossible to 
"stop the dissemination of television across the 
frontiers." He feared that "member states, often acting 
under pressure from interested lobbies, will try and 
introduce regulatory systems which are at variance with one 
another" resulting in further fragmentation rather than
52 Commission of the European Communities, The 
M.E.D.I.A. Programme, pp. 1-4.
3 ‘Eckstein, Television, p. 61.
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increased unification. This would undermine the Community 
and the good of Europe. He believed, however, that 
television could not be approached in isolation but needed 
to be viewed as an integral part of Europe's economic and 
cultural objectives. Rights of citizens and national 
interests also could not be overlooked.34
Commissioner for Information Technology Karl-Heinz 
Narjes said that "without a standardization policy, Europe 
will inevitably be condemned to Babellization."33 He 
believed that the Commission needed to work out policies 
and actions in close collaboration with industry. It made 
no sense to develop standards that would cripple industrial 
firms. Therefore all sectors within the Community had to 
cooperate in developing television policies.36
Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana sought backing for 
the Europa project and was among the most vocal in 
expressing outrage and disappointment at its termination.
De Meana urged that European television policies be 
developed with minimal regulations, primarily concentrating 
on the creation of uniform technical standards, stimulating 
multilingual broadcasting, and overcoming legal obstacles
34 Statement by Lord Cockfield in reply to the 
"Debate on Television Without Frontiers," Strasbourg,
September 12, 1985, pp. 1-4.
33"E .C . Pushes Standards for Telecommunications,"
Europe, July/August 1985, p. 47.
rjb"E.C. Proposal Would Limit TV Advertising,"
Europe, June 19 86, p. 39.
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within the Community. He was enthusiastic about the 
capability of Europa to transmit programs simultaneously in 
many languages. He believed that through this kind of 
multilingual service "for the first time since the Roman 
Empire" it would be possible for Europe to exist without 
language barriers. The absence of these barriers would 
mean a more unified Europe. Oi Meana pointed to one event 
in particular as decisive in his assessment of the 
importance of the development of a European approach to 
television. When the U.S. bombed Libya in 1986, he 
learned of the bombing while watching the Cable News 
Network (CNN) in a European hotel room. This privately- 
owned U.S. news service provided, he believed, "only the 
American point-of-view and interest" in this international 
dispute. This displayed America's potential dominance of 
satellite television programming. Europe must not allow 
American biases and cultural perspectives to shape news 
reporting and attitudes of European people. He favored 
further integration of Europe and economic stimulation of 
the European programming community in order to develop more 
European programming and believed that Europe must become 
less dependent on American programming.37
Council of Ministers and European Council
The Council of Ministers and the European Council
37Di Meana, Brussels speech.
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were the only branches of the Community which directly 
represented the member-states of the Community. They had 
to balance desires for EC growth and the strengthening of 
the European cause in the world with concerns for the 
people, companies, and ways of life within their individual 
nations. By custom since 1966, all Council of Minister 
decisions were unanimous. This process often required 
lengthy debates, reviews, and compromises to reach 
agreements.38 A completed Commission policy 
recommendation had to be submitted to the EP for its 
consideration and approval. Once approved by the EP, the 
policy was referred to member-state governments for review. 
No specific time limits were set for this period; in some 
cases reviews took as long as fifteen years. Their final 
conclusions and recommendations would come through the 
Council of Ministers and/or the European Council. With 
Council of Ministers approval, member-nations would be 
given a set time to bring their own media policies in line 
with Community policies.38
Summary
Throughout the European Economic Community there 
was strong belief that television was a decisive factor for 
the creation of an integrated Europe. The Parliament,
38 Stuart de la Mahotidre, Towards One Europe 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 297-9.
38 Cable and Satellite Europe, May 1986, p. 47.
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Commission, and even the Council spoke clearly and often 
about the need for European standards and strategies. The 
Court of Justice told the nations they had to comply with 
the Treaties they had signed and not hinder the reception 
or distribution of broadcasting signals throughout the 
Community. Yet there remained significant national 
policies and laws which violated the spirit and even the 
letter of the Treaties of Rome and Paris.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET
In April 1982, facing uncertain financial return 
and significant political and regulatory obstacles, an 
English-language television service called "Sky Channel" 
began broadcasting via satellite from the U.K. Rather than 
wait for all the legal and political issues involving 
commercial television throughout Europe to be resolved, Sky 
Channel decided to move ahead with its distribution and 
marketing. Growth at first was slow, but more and more 
cable television systems throughout Europe began asking for 
and receiving their government’s approval to carry Sky 
Channel. The public began to be aware of this new service 
and demand for it increased. While national governments, 
the EC, and other IGOs wrestled with weighty political 
issues such as sovereignty, legal parameters, and 
programming philosophy. Sky Channel created a genuine 
European television service.1
1 Information regarding Sky Channel and other 
television satellite services was based in part on meetings 
with the following advertising agency executives: Ian
Speer, Ted Bates Advertising, London, June 26, 1985; Phil 
Reber, Doyle Dane Bernbach Advertising, London, June 28, 
1985; Simon Lloyd, Foote, Cone, and Belding Advertising,
116
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Sky Channel's inpact was significant in part 
because of the kind of programming it offered. Many 
statesmen and visionaries dreamed of a television service 
showcasing exclusively European-produced programs that 
would reflect the finest representation of its distinctive 
culture. However, Sky Channel's schedule was comprised 
mainly of movies, older situation comedies, action- 
adventure series, and professional wrestling. Almost ail 
of its programming initially was of American origin.2 To 
the concern of many leaders in Europe, English-language 
programs were beamed across the continent, all to positive 
and even enthusiastic reception by the public. People all 
over Europe demonstrated a hunger for the kind of diverse 
programming this new commercial service provided. 
Overnight, Sky Channel became a sensation.3 By 1987, more 
than ten million households across Europe were receiving 
English-language programming from Sky Channel. Less than 
three percent of these households were in the U.K., 
demonstrating how European Sky Channel's delivery had 
become.4 Its success compounded fears that American 
cultural influences, which were perceived already as being
London, June 26, 1985; and Leo Stumpel, Foote, Cone, and 
Belding Advertising, Amsterdam. September 28, 1984.
2 Sky Channel sales brochure.
3Brenda Maddox, "Sky King," pp. 53-55.
4”In Vision," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 
1987, pp. 54-55.
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too strong, might become even stronger. Rather than a 
cultural resurgence for Europe, pan-European television 
seemed to be spawning what came to be called "American 
cultural imperialism."9
The governments of Europe reacted to the marketing
inroads and appeal of Sky Channel in many ways. Each
national government retained the right to license reception 
of all satellite programming services into the country 
through its PTT. The exercise of this power violated
Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibited
signatory nations from blocking reception of any 
broadcasting service sent from another signatory nation. 
Since Sky Channel transmitted from the U.K. and was seen at 
least in some parts of the U.K., it was illegal under 
Community law to block its reception for any reason. Yet 
this was done. Since Sky Channel was available only 
through satellite distribution, it had to negotiate with 
each national PTT to be cleared for reception. This 
process took years of negotiations. Through its 
persistence, Sky Channel overcame distribution obstacles, 
and by 1987 it was received in some form in every major 
country in western Europe.8
Once Sky Channel proved there was a market for
sDi Meana speech.
6"In Vision," Cable and Satellite Europe, June 
1987, pp. 54-55.
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satellite television in Europe, other services were 
developed. These included services dedicated to French- 
language variety programs (TV-5), religious programs (Mew 
World Channel), English-language movies (Premiere and TEN), 
children's shows (The Children's Channel), sports (Screen 
Sport), women's programming (Lifestyle), and several 
American networks, including Cable News Network and MTV 
Europe.7 In early 1987, the ITV companies of the U.K. 
introduced a service called SuperChannel, to compete 
directly with Sky Channel for the English-language general 
entertainment audience.8 The proliferation of satellite 
networks in the late 1980s prompted one television 
executive to describe the situation as "technology gone 
mad. "9
Interest in Sky Channel and other satellite
television networks was stimulated by the desire and need
of multinational corporations for media to deliver 
advertising messages to Europe. Advertising on radio and 
television had been unavailable or restricted in all 
European markets.10 Restrictions and policies existed in
7 "Datafile," Cable and Satellite Europe, July 1987,
p. 64.
8 Laurel Wentz, "Pan-European TV Rivals Need Larger 
Ad Market," Advertising Age. February 16, 1987.
9 "Crowded Skies Over Europe," Sales and Marketing
Management. June 1987, p. 35.
10Madlyn Resener, "The Coming Boom in European 
Advertising," Adweek. September ;8, 1986, p. F.P. 4.
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each nation making it difficult or impossible to develop 
advertising and marketing that could be applied throughout 
Europe.11 In the Netherlands, for example, advertising 
time had to be requested months and in some cases more than 
a year in advance of the airing of the commercial to meet 
government guidelines.12 European businesses hoped for 
years that television controls would be loosened, new 
television services would be introduced, and that it would 
be possible to have the same kind of access and availa­
bility advertisers enjoyed in the U.S.13
Sky Channel inaugurated a new kind of delivery 
system which allowed an advertiser to transmit one 
advertising message and have it received simultaneously 
throughout Europe. Its sales literature proclaimed that 
satellite television offered advertisers in Europe "an 
entirely new opportunity— a European audience." Sky 
Channel encouraged the development of an integrated market 
by appealing to multinational companies and manufacturers 
which could use satellite television "to boost and enhance 
their brand image, harmonizing product awareness across 
Europe." Sky Channel claimed to be "the first TV station 
dedicated to home entertainment across Europe." The
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emphasis was not on European origins but on entertainment 
for Europe.14
The marketplace responded enthusiastically to the 
concept of satellite television. Its introduction in many 
nations coincided with the introduction of private tele­
vision and/or loosening of standards for commercial 
utilization of television. Authorities from many pro­
fessions throughout Europe and America observed the impact 
that the introduction of these new media had on Europe. A 
Lisbon advertising executive said, "Private television will 
serve as a catalyst in the market and will open up the 
possibility of more new [product] launches."19 An American 
marketing executive said he was expecting Europe "to be a 
lot more flexible in TV and the marketplace. Anything that 
would deregulate the government shackles on those countries 
is good for business and product development."19 A French 
advertising manager said, "We used to talk about pan- 
European marketing and advertising only as a theory." He 
concluded that national boundaries were disappearing in 
Europe and that advertisers had started to treat Europe as 
one market.17 The giant American packaged goods company,
14 Sky Channel Sales Brochure.
18 Julie Skur Hill, "Marketers Eye European TV," 
Advertising Age, December 1, 1986, p. 68.
16 Ibid.
17Madlyn Resener, "Europe's New Mass Market
Appeal," Adweek, June 1, 1987, p. G.A. 6.
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Procter and Gamble, began manufacturing products for 
European distribution with unified package designs.1* A 
London executive said, MTo segment markets by nationality 
is naive" since Europe's leading businesses looked for 
"cross-cultural marketing" which could apply to all 
countries in Europe.19 A major international advertising 
agency, DDB Needham Worldwide, developed the word 
"Euromarketing" to describe its concept of market trends in 
Europe. It concluded that there were few significant 
differences in consumer behavior among European peoples 
throughout the continent. They found there were more 
things binding Europeans together than dividing them, and 
that the trend toward greater commonality and integration 
was accelerating.20 In May 1987, the president of the 
European Association of Advertising Agencies, Armand de 
Malherbe, predicted that satellite television would 
transform Europe into one market. He concluded that "the 
Europe we have known is about to disappear into the mist of 
history," and that "the 3,200 miles of frontiers that 
divided Europe will be erased." He said television was the 
primary cause of this development.21 A 1986 study by two
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., pp. G.A. 6-7.
20 Ibid., p. G.A. 14.
21 Stewart Alter, "TV Melts Europe's Borders," 
Advertising Age. May 18, 1987.
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Kent State University professors concluded that three 
trends dominated European marketing in the 1930s. First, 
marketers were less concerned about targeting their efforts 
at individual national markets. Instead they were 
attempting to reach Europeans as consumers regardless of 
the particular nation in which they lived. Second, more 
companies were developing a single product with one image 
for all of Europe. Products in many categories received 
common packaging and promotion efforts. In the past 
companies had treated each nation as a separate market. 
Third, there was a "rapid increase in the use of satellite 
television for commercial purposes." Satellite television 
was proving a tool to stimulate unification in Europe. The 
European consumer had begun to develop a new identity based 
increasingly on images originating from outside the nation. 
This lead to an expanded sense of Europe as the focus for 
the future European market.22
However, the impact of satellite television did not 
mean that Europe existed as a single, unified political 
entity. More often than not, growth of satellite tele­
vision came in spite of political obstacles. Sky 
Channel's Managing Director, Patrick Cox, explained that 
the Channel had to overcome enormous legal obstacles 
necessitated by the political conditions in Europe. Even
22 John Ryans, Jr., and Donald Howard, "A 
Continental Market," American Demographics Magazine, July 
1987, p. 54.
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if marketing and advertising professionals had begun 
treating Europe as one market, each country remained 
separate. Negotiations took place over substantial periods 
of time with each governmental organization and with 
individual cable systems. Sky Channel's experience proved 
to Cox that the EC needed to lay down and enforce new 
ground rules and sweep away the massive confusion that 
existed in European television in order for satellite 
television services to be able to exist.23 Cox's appraisal 
was in contrast to the optimistic press attention Sky 
Channel often received. Sky Channel's successes came at 
tremendous cost; it had never been profitable. In fact, in 
September 1987, rumors surfaced that Sky Channel was for 
sale or that new partners were being sought to help defray 
operational costs.24
Sky Channel also introduced another element to the 
European satellite television debate: the role of the
independently wealthy entrepreneur. In 1982 Sky Channel 
was purchased by Australian newspaper magnate Rupert 
Murdoch.23 The introduction of a person with the wealth 
and independence of Murdoch in an industry previously
23 Patrick Cox, speech delivered at the Conference 
on the Future of Television in Europe, Brussels, October 
15, 1986.
24"Murdock Denies Sky Sale Rumor," Variety, 
September 16, 1987, p. 52.
2 3 Sky Channel Sales Brochure.
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controlled almost entirely by governments caused concern in 
Europe. Many people wondered if his involvement in 
satellite television was too commercial for the good of 
Europe.26 However, Murdoch proved to be merely the first 
of the entrepreneurs to enter the satellite television 
business. He was joined by Robert Maxwell, Murdoch's rival 
in the English publishing industry, and by the Italian 
Silvio Berlusconi, the Frenchmen Jerome Seydoux, the 
German Leo Kirch, and others.
Berlusconi allied himself with the Socialist Party 
in Italy and sought to use this alliance to increase his 
influence in Italy and throughout Europe. He became full 
or part owner of television stations in France, Spain, as 
well as Italy.27 Proving the degree to which he was 
thinking on a European scale, Berlusconi announced plans to 
develop a television service that would help unit the 
European market. "Imagine a single program linking all of 
Europe from a single broadcaster,” he said. "Europe has 
been looking for its unity for years, for a United States 
of Europe. Only television can create such a reality."
This ambition made him admired as well as feared.28
26Many speakers, Conference on the Future of 
Television in Europe, Brussels, October 15-16, 1986.
27"Toward the Unification of Europe," Videoage, 
April 1986, p. 104.
28Jack Loftus, "Italo Kingpin Eyes Pan-Euro TV," 
Variety, October 23, 1985, p. 1.
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In early 1987, Robert Maxwell, who had already been 
involved with several European satellite television 
services including the Premiere movie service, created an 
organization called the European Television Broadcasting 
Corporation. This corporation was designed to become a new 
satellite television service for all of Europe because "the 
people of Europe want television without frontiers."** 
Another major private satellite television venture was the 
Astra project developed by the Soci6t6 Europ6enne des 
Satellites (SES) from Luxembourg. The important role this 
organization played in Europe was symbolized when it hired 
of former EC Vice-Commissioner Etienne Davignon. According 
to Karl Johannesson, president of one of SES* investors, 
the Luxembourg government and its partners were committed 
to create a major pan-European satellite delivery system.
It planned to force distribution of its service. Because 
Luxembourg was a member in the EC, no other EC nation 
legally could block reception of Astra programs. SES 
planned delivery of private and public television services, 
including programs from entrepreneurs like Murdoch and 
Berlusconi, that would bring Europe a new level of 
programming choices.30
29Lisa Bannon and Peggy Ziegler, "Maxwell Unveils 
Plans for Pan-European Network," Multichannel News. April 
13, 1987, p. 1.
30Interview with Karl Johannesson, Virginia Beach, 
Virginia, November 21, 1986.
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Major private corporations and entrepreneurs were 
not the only ones hoping for new initiatives in private 
television in Europe. Europe's film and television 
production industries embraced the new medium of satellite 
television and encouraged its development to stimulate 
production, create new jobs, and make their industry more 
competitive.31 In 1985 companies from six countries agreed 
to form a European production group, uniting the skills and 
resources of organizations from France, Italy, Austria, 
Switzerland, the U.K., and Germany. Their goal was to 
preserve the European content of their programs and promote 
Europe's "artistic and production infrastructure."32 Co­
ventures like this were formed to meet the projected needs 
for the European television industry of the future as well 
as to create a uniquely European product that was 
marketable in Europe and elsewhere in the world.33
Summary
The private sector shared many of the same hopes of 
political leaders for a unified Europe. Monnet, de Vries, 
Hahn, Lord Cockfield, and others in the political sphere 
worked for European integratation, but they faced resist­
31"Pic Producers See Savior in TV," Variety, May 
20, 1987, pp. 1, 62.
32Jack Monnet, "Euro-British Production Group 
Formed," Variety. June 29, 1985.
33Cox speech.
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ance from national governments and other forces. However, 
while politicians talked about the day when Europe would 
exist without frontiers, businesses began to conduct their 
affairs as though the common market existed. The 
development of satellite television provided a means for 
men like Murdoch and Berlusconi to televise programs 
throughout Europe that could be seen daily by people in 
every country. Through satellite technology, advertising 
agencies and multinational corporations could distributing 
single product and lifestyle images throughout the 
continent. The private sector grasped the significance of 
the communications revolution and for its purposes made the 
European market a reality.
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CHAPTER VII 
THE EMERGING CONSENSUS 
IN EUROPEAN TELEVISION
This thesis set out to demonstrate that there was a 
relationship between television and the integration of 
Europe. It specifically attempted to prove the hypothesis 
that the integration process in Europe would continue 
because of activities in the television industry.
Satellite television was to be deaonstrated to be a 
critical factor in this process, and the reaction of 
national governaents in Europe to it was a bellwether of 
the future of integration. This also atteapted to 
establish that the integration of the television market 
needed to precede the integration of the entire European 
market. The work of integration theorists Karl Deutsch, 
Ernst Haas, and Amitai Etzioni were cited as the foundation 
for this study. Etzioni's four stage model of integration 
was established as the specific framework used to measure 
Europe's progress toward becoming an integrated 
organization.
A survey of the television market in Europe in 
1987 found the market in a state of tremendous flux. Total 
control of television was established by national
129
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governments prior to the introduction of satellites, in 
part bacausa of television's power to craata and influanca 
images, opinions, and lifastylas. Television acted to 
preserve indigenous cultures and provide common 
"communication habits" that helped form a sense of 
connunity within each nation.1 Even though the exact 
nature varied, controls were part of the fabric of 
television in Europe. Yet substantial differences existed 
in policies. Technical standards and policies on adver­
tising varied. Some nations developed state monopolies 
while others let private enterprise have a greater 
influence. Within the EC, the Treaties of Rome and Paris 
prohibited nations from blocking reception of broadcast 
signals from other member-nations. While none hindered 
reception from over-the-air signals, the growth of cable 
television provided a medium through which censorship was 
feasible. Some choices had to be made on the number of 
services a cable system would carry and which services 
would be carried. The introduction of satellites further 
complicated this problem since more choices were available 
for carriage by cable systems. As cable and satellite 
television grew, past national controls over television 
remained in effect. Controls in the satellite era became 
communication barriers as they restricted the free flow of 
information throughout the Community.2 National
1Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
2Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 74.
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governments blocked the kind of broad communication 
interaction across frontiers that lead to the 
establishment of unifying habits which Deutsch claimed were 
necessary to achieve integration.* Rather, nationally 
controlled television continued to reenforce national 
loyalties, allegiances, and integration.
However, with satellite television it becaae as 
simple to receive a transmission from the U.K. in Spain as 
in the U.K. itself. All that was needed was the proper 
technical equipment and reception was possible. Satellite 
television unleashed new market forces, changed consumer 
demands, and created the potential for communications 
systems that were truly European in nature. In fact, 
satellite television provided the instrument through which 
integration of the marketplace could move forward and 
eventually lead to greater unification of Europe. It made 
it less possible for national governments to control the 
flow of information and entertainment in their own 
nations. People throughout Europe would be able to develop 
shared habits of communication, which was an essential 
element in Deutsch's definition of integration.4 
Information through television could then flow to Europeans 
not only from national centers but also from locations 
throughout Europe. This kind of movement, in Haas's
3Deutsch, Political Community, p. 33.
4 Ibid., p. 41.
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definition of integration, would lead to the shifting of 
"loyalties, expectations and political activities" away 
from individual nations to a greater European center.8
This investigation revealed how television 
activities in Europe through 1987 followed Etzioni*s four 
stage model of integration.8 Television was a vital 
environmental factor in the life of European society, with 
television stations in each country and increasing 
attention being given to television activities at both the 
national and European levels. Satellite television was 
decisive in creating common perspectives on events that 
would be shared by people throughout Europe.7 Leaders 
within the EC grasped the impact this innovation had for 
the cause of European integration. They observed that 
Europe was fragmented into national markets where 
broadcasting activity was regulated by national govern­
ments.8 Paralleling Etzioni*s model, the second stage 
focused on elite groups and their impact on this 
environment. The concentration accorded television by 
groups throughout Europe in the 1980s proved that tele­
vision had become a subject of significant concern.
Papers and policy proposals were written and developed by
°Haas, Uniting of Europe, p. 16.
8Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 15, 16, 37, 51.
7Deutsch, Nationalism, p. 70-71.
8Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes," p. 16.
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the EC and Council of Europe. Over tine, neny elite groups 
were formed to administer or coordinate European actions 
toward various facets of television. These included the 
EBU, ESA, and EUTELSAT. Cooperation in these areas, 
coupled with advances in the development of satellite and 
cable television led to transitional activities typical of 
Etzioni's third stage of unification. Various unit sectors 
began exhibiting characteristics of integration. In 
television these sectors included program production and 
governmental departments and private companies responsible 
for technical standards. Significant efforts were made to 
establish uniform technical standards, and increased 
cooperative program production projects between nations 
were begun. Other agreements on television policies were 
agreed upon through the EC and other IGOs.
The movement toward integration of Europe had 
advanced in part through the influence of satellite 
television. Yet total integration had not been achieved. 
The research that went into this thesis led to agreement 
with Levitt that the superior technology of satellite 
television would lead to increased reduction in the 
barriers that existed throughout Europe.9 Satellite 
television had power of enormous magnitude, and the Europe 
of 1987 had only begun to experience the force of 
innovations in communications technology. A persistent
9Levitt, Marketing Imagination, pp. 31-32.
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drive in the reseerch end development sectors of major 
electronics industries assured on-going technological 
advances. The future promised that new, more powerful 
satellites would be built, and that mechanisms to receive 
programming services from these satellites would be 
available for affordable prices. Reception clarity would 
be enhanced, and viewing options would continue to expand 
through the introduction of new programming services and 
increased distribution of existing services. The flow of 
events pointed inexorably toward the prospect of more 
opportunities for interrationships between people and 
organizations throughout Europe through these communica­
tions advances.
However, the force of these technologies did not 
exist in a free marketplace. European nations historically 
favored controlled growth and regulation of their 
economies, particularly following World War II. They had 
demonstrated an understandable desire for the preservation 
of their own cultures and ways of life, and resisted 
efforts to erode national cohesiveness.10 The willingness 
of these nations to embrace integration had come with an 
understanding that national sovereignty and the protection 
of indigenous cultures would be maintained. Satellite 
television introduced forces that threatened both the 
tradition of controls and the nature of society. National
10Dutch Ministry, Policy Document, p. 10, for example.
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governments which had so carefully guarded their own 
societies against influences they deemed harmful or 
undesirable were faced with the reality that new satellite 
programming services of multiple origins could come into 
their nations. Services were controlled by American 
multinational corporations like CNN and MTV, as well as by 
entrepreneurs like Berlusconi and Murdoch. Programs 
included what some considered American cultural imperial­
ism1 1 as well as programming content that some people 
believed was not desirable.1* They had to find ways to 
protect their indigenous cultures, satisfy the demands of 
their citizens, and encourage program production. However, 
they had to face financial realities as well. Satellite 
television was more expensive to develop and oversee than 
broadcast television. High costs were a major reason for 
the termination of Europa and led to problems for Sky 
Channel, Europe's most successful satellite television 
service. Even a nation such as France wondered how it 
would pay for its own new direct broadcast satellite. 
Nations had to ask if they could afford to fund the 
development and oversight of television in the satellite 
era.
Television also proved a litmus test of integration
xlDi Meana speech.
12 Commission, Television Without Frontiers, p. 286-
98.
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efforts. Nations could not say that they were in favor of 
integration and continue to resist reception of satellite 
television services. If nations wanted to increase the 
interaction with other citizens and nations of Europe to 
the point that they becane integrated, satellite television 
provided an ideal vehicle. If nations sought to foster the 
development of a community spirit throughout Europe, what 
better way than to encourage the exchange of television 
programs from perspectives of many nations and points of 
view. If nations wanted to nourish the European culture 
and heritage, television provided a vehicle for an on-going 
showcase of European programs and talents. If nations 
wanted to develop a European market without frontiers in 
which goods flowed without impediment from nation to 
nation, television provided a delivery system for informa­
tion about products and services.
The consensus in Europe was that some regulations 
over satellite and television use were needed and that a 
free market in these industries was not advisable.
Eutelsat believed that there were limits to the number of 
satellites that could be supported economically in Europe 
and that an unregulated satellite development was 
impractical. The EC, while encouraging pan-European 
television, also proposed rules to control its development, 
including programming and advertising standards. The 
Council of Europe, as well as the EC and individual nations
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sought to assure protection of minorities from dominance by 
the majority. But the question remained how much regula­
tion of television each nation would allow to be made at 
the European level and how much it would insist on 
retaining. Each nation also had to determine if its 
policies and regulations would encourage pan-European 
television or attempt to squelch it.
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the 
integration process will continue throughout Europe unless 
the national governments prevented it. Therefore, the fate 
of the integration movement rests with these governments. 
Their decisions will determine the scope, shape, and 
intensity of the integration process. The first alter­
native scenario assumed that integration would not proceed 
if national governments reaffirmed their own controls over 
television and the rest of national life. Applying 
Etzioni's model, if these governments preserve their 
controls over television, they would have reached the 
third stage of unification and achieved integration in 
selected unit sectors only. This scenario would mean that 
all or some nations have determined not to move forward 
into a more fully integrated Europe. This embrace of 
nationalism would suggest a rejection of increased 
integration. This scenario is not likely. The power and 
influence of satellite television are simply too great. 
Nations could limit but not eliminate the presence and
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impact of satellite communications. The spillover of 
television programs through broadcast, cable, and satellite 
distribution systems has already created interlocking 
habits of communication that are essential to the integra­
tion process.13 Such new technologies as direct broadcast 
satellites and home satellite dishes, as well as further 
advances in cable television and KATV systems will make the 
blocking of integration of Europe's television market and 
the rest of Europe almost impossible.
The second scenario suggested that integration 
would proceed along two or more paths simultaneously with 
some nations pursuing further integration and others 
electing not to pursue it. However, the fact that some 
nations chose to retain stronger national controls would 
not mean that others were prohibited from pursuing integra­
tion. A nation with tight controls and concerns about 
outside involvement could determine not to pursue pan- 
Europeanism, while other nations would elect to continue 
integration efforts. In Etzioni's model, the nations 
seeking greater integration would proceed through the third 
stage to the fourth stage, while others would not move to 
the fourth stage at all. This hypothesis included the 
assumption that nations would approach integration from 
unique and individualistic perspectives. Some would pursue 
integration more aggressively, while others determined to
13Deutsch, Political Community, p. 41.
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move more slowly, or not at all. This scenario was, in 
fact, fairly realistic. It would allow for more region­
alism in which compatible countries would pursue integra­
tion or enhanced cooperation. The nations of Scandinavia 
pursued this direction with their Tele-X project, while in 
central Europe France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
attempted to coordinate their development of satellite 
television. The EC nations could move forward toward an 
integrated market without frontiers while other European 
nations resisted integration. Another possibility would be 
further integration within the EC itself along regional 
lines. The southern nations (Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal) may become more integrated as would the nations 
in the northern part of the Community. The result of this 
scenario would be an integration of a part or of parts of 
Europe.
The third scenario tested was a continuation of 
the status quo in 1987. In this scenario, television 
activities would continue to include fairly strong national 
controls, and nations would work together through various 
IGOs on cooperative television ventures. There would be a 
harmonization of technical standards and an attempt to 
eliminate any harmful or divisive regulations or laws. But 
the full integration of television policies, as well as the 
political sovereignty within Europe, would not be either 
abandoned or embraced completely. Nations would continue
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working together whenever it was advisable, agreeable, or 
convenient; but national controls over television and other 
aspects of national life would remain fin. Satellites 
would be used more for national or regional television 
purposes, with pan-European efforts restricted through 
government controls. Europe would remain a pluralistic 
community and continue to be interrelated rather than 
integrated. It is the conclusion of this thesis that this 
scenario was not likely. The power and potential of 
satellite television is too great for the status quo to 
continue. European nations would have to proceed with 
integration, individually or as a unit.
Subjects for Further Research 
This thesis has approached the impact of tele­
vision on the integration of Europe from an essentially 
non-quantitative perspective. It has evaluated the actions 
of men, nations, and organizations in light of definitions 
provided by integration theorists and attempted to under­
stand the integration activities without specifically 
measurable variables. However, this study suggested that 
such variables exist and merit further analysis. These 
variable include the following:
1. The number of non-national services available 
for viewing in each country. If European integration 
continues, barriers to reception within Europe should 
disappear and more non-national services become available.
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2. The number of television services transmitting 
on satellite. An increase in satellite television services 
would indicate an acceptance of cross border programming as 
well as financial conditions conducive to the kind of 
monetary commitments necessary to achieve success and 
expansion in satellite communications. The presence of 
more private satellite television services would indicate 
the existence of a large and unified enough European market 
to warrant the private sector to invest in satellite tele­
vision. This also would indicate that national barriers to 
television reception had been relaxed.
3. Television viewing of non-national services.
If integration proceeded, more of these services would be 
available and Europeans would spend more time watching 
them.
4. The number of households with access to non­
broadcast television reception, including cable television, 
private satellite dishes for direct broadcast satellite 
viewing, and master antennae systems. Integration would 
mean a reduction of national barriers to the development of 
these media.
5. The elimination or loosening of laws prohib­
iting or restricting reception of non-national satellite 
services. The presence of such laws would indicate the 
degree to which integration had fallen short. Their 
elimination or loosening would indicate movement toward
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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6. The number of television programs produced by 
multinational organizations, or co-ventures between 
organizations in different countries. Multinational 
program production would stimulate the integration process 
by increasing interaction and cooperation among peoples in 
many nations.
7. Percentage of airtime on all television 
services devoted to European-produced programs. Increased 
production would indicate increased opportunities for 
producers in Europe and the opening of the European tele­
vision market.
8. The number of people who spoke and/or 
understood languages other than the traditionally dominant 
language of their nation. Increased integration of the 
television market would increase the availability of 
programs in other languages which in turn would lead to an 
increase in the understanding of non-national languages.
Each of the above variables is measurable and can 
be tracked to indicate the degree to which integration has 
taken place through or because of television activity.
But, in addition to these quantifiable variables, others 
exist which cannot specifically be measured but which can 
be observed. Increased activity in these areas would 
provide demonstrable evidence of the influence of tele­
vision on European integration.
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The content of speeches by heads of state and of 
government regarding the role of television in Europe could 
be used as indicators. The more these people address the 
television issue the more important television would seem 
to be for Europe's future. Lack of attention by these 
people would indicate the absence of a political mandate or 
will to address the deeper issues represented by television 
and its role in society. In addition, articles written in 
non-television or advertising and marketing industry 
publications (such as The Economist and The Times of 
London) concerning television and its role in integrating 
Europe would indicate its perceived importance to the 
overall European marketplace.
Action by European IGOs or national governments 
regarding the television industry or policies could be 
observed. These would include actions taken by national 
PTTs or broadcasting organizations to encourage European or 
multinational approaches to television issues or activ­
ities, as well as conferences called by the Council of 
Europe, the EC, or other IGOs, to study television issues 
or recommend new policies. Also measurable would be the 
creation and approval of copyright regulations that 
eliminate problems in receiving or transmitting satellite 
or cross-border, over-the-air television services. The 
copyright issues created many problems in developing 
satellite television, and a resolution of this issue would
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provide considerable stimulation to the development of 
more pan-European activity in the television industry. 
Another evidence of integration progress would be the 
creation of new IGOs for determing aspects of television 
policy or activity.
The elimination or easing of restrictions on the 
sale, manufacturing, and installation of home satellite 
dishes would indicate that European nations were more 
willing for their citizens to receive programs directly 
from satellites. Many experts have predicted that Europe 
will be a major market for such direct broadcast satel­
lites, but this would not be possible unless governments 
throughout Europe eliminated restrictions to their 
manufacture and sale.
Trends
A survey of satellite television and the European 
marketplace of 1987 has resulted in the development of a 
point-of-view on trends that may take place in Europe in 
television-related activities in coming years. The 
following trends may be identified as likely, based on this 
investigation:
1. Satellite technology will continue to advance, 
as more powerful, technically sophisticated satellites will 
be built and launched. This will enable the development of 
smaller mechanisms capable of receiving signals from 
satellites, including compact home and portable receive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
units. Combined with 1 ess expensive production end 
increased complexity and capacity of micro-technology, 
direct satellite-to-home television will become a dominant 
television medium in Europe.
2. The heightened availability of satellite-to- 
home television will enable people throughout Europe to 
receive more programs than previously. There will be fewer 
national distinctions in programming, and a European focus 
will become dominant as station and production executives 
target an audience throughout Europe.
3. Technological means, including audio sub­
carrier capabilities, will be developed to enable programs 
to be distributed and received in several languages 
simultaneously at affordable cost levels.
4. While Europeans will band together to some 
degree, international programming will become organized 
more on a global basis, with more co-ventures and joint 
productions involving organizations throughout the world. 
Economies of scale, international ownership and financing, 
and operational efficiencies will lead to cooperation, 
production, and distribution by multinational corporations. 
The resulting situation will be a hybrid in which more 
entertainment programs will be produced internationally but 
where local and regional focuses will be created and 
sustained through news, cultural, and public affairs 
programs.
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5. European television standards and policies will 
be established and clarified allowing national implementa­
tion and controls within parameters established through an 
expanded EC. There will be a harmonization of policies of 
the EC and the Council of Europe.
6. Europe will become increasingly integrated, 
but national, local, and regional distinctions will remain 
and even be intensified in some cases. There will be 
resistance to homogenization, and local and national 
factions will urge autonomy and resist Europeanization and 
globalization of the media. Compromises will be arranged 
to satisfy national interests, including the encouragement 
of national broadcast stations that would continue to allow 
national issues and concerns to be met.
7. Advertising policies will become more 
flexible, with general acceptance of advertising as a form 
of program funding. However, advertising will continue to 
be regulated by national governments within policies 
established at the European level. There will be resistance 
to giving advertisers the scope and freedom they are 
allowed in the United States.
8. A new organization will be created within the 
EC to oversee television and other mass media. This 
organization will be patterned after the Federal 
Communications Commission in the U.S.
9. The late 1980s and early 1990s will be a time
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in which many satellite television ventures will fail or be 
forced to reduce operations due to financial problems.
While Europe moves through a transitional phase in the 
integration of the continent and the development of satel­
lite communication, costs will remain high; and great 
risks will have to be taken to participate in the satellite 
television business. Financial troubles will affect both 
private and public television ventures. Government- 
sponsored satellite and television projects will have 
economic difficulties, and some will fail. However, from 
these troubles and failures will emerge better planned and 
organized television enterprises that are suited to 
realistic economic and business-oriented management.
10. The entrepreneurs who invaded the satellite 
television field in its early years will continue to play 
an active role in the short-term. However, pressures will 
be brought by various unions, associations, IGOs, and 
politicians throughout Europe to limit their influence. 
Therefore action will be taken to encourage publicly-backed 
services and ventures and to restrict the influence of 
entrepreneurs such as Murdoch and Berlusconi.
Conclusion
Regardless of the course the nations of Europe 
take in the coming years, television has proven to be a 
major factor in its future. Television will prove to be a 
barometer of the nature of European integration, and the
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people of Europe will see their lives influenced nore by 
this medium than they have in the past.
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